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THESIS

**CIVIL RESISTANCE: AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OF A TOTAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

by

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June 2014

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OF A TOTAL DEFENSE STRATEGY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

In 1994 Gene Sharp, founder of the Albert Einstein Institution, which advances the study of nonviolent action, met former Estonian minister of defense Hain Rebas and suggested that civil resistance be added to Estonian Defense Policy. The idea never materialized. The current National Defense Policy and National Defense Strategy do not include civil resistance. The Estonian National Defense Development Plan for 2013–2022 states that military capability at the end of 2022 will consist of up to 90,000 soldiers, which is less than 10 percent of the Estonian population. Comprehensive state defense does not use the nation’s non-military capability even though there is recognition that civil resistance is an important force multiplier. This thesis urges Estonia to reconsider Sharp’s proposal.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEI	Albert Einstein Institution
ECP	Estonian Communist Party
ENIP	Estonian Independence Party
ERSP	Estonian National Independence Party
ERSS	Estonian Folk Dance and Folk Music Association
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
MRP-AEG	Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCO	Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
PFE	Popular Front of Estonia

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Throughout the centuries, security issues have shaped military policies, defense strategies and military forces. Unlike big states, small states often have limited options to defend their sovereignty. They also try to imitate the armed forces of big states. Sandor Fabian argues that, “[small states] should innovate by starting to ‘harvest from the edges of strategic thought,’¹—particularly thinking about irregular warfare—to enhance their prospects for successful self-defense and national survival.”² Fabian adds, “They should look for a less usual, less generally accepted, but possibly more effective solution, which should include the integration of guerilla warfare and other irregular warfare methods into their homeland-defense strategy.”³ One potential solution for small states could be integrating standing military forces with civilian mobilization.

Estonia as a small state has taken an irregular approach and has combined military and non-military capabilities for national defense, which is described as comprehensive state defense. The role of civil mobilization is defined in the National Security Concept of Estonia, which states “Estonia’s security is strengthened by its civil society where civic initiative plays [an] important role in the enhancement of national security and advancement of the sense of security.”⁴ According to the National Defense Strategy, if Estonia loses territory to the enemy during conflict, Estonian citizens inside occupied areas will be organized as a resistance element for continuous struggle.⁵

¹ John Arquilla, “Warfare in the Information Age” (lecture notes, Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Spring 2011).

² Sandor Fabian, “Professional Irregular Defence Forces: The Other Side of COIN” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 165.

³ Ibid., 29.

⁴ *Estonian Ministry of Defense*, “National Security Concept of Estonia,” unofficial translation, 4,http://kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/9470_National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf.

⁵ *Estonian Ministry of Defense*, “National Defense Strategy,” 8, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng%282%29.pdf.

Civilian contribution to national defense could be implemented in various ways and under various conditions. The civil contribution could be multifaceted, passive or active, violent or nonviolent, starting with civilian-based defense or unarmed civil resistance and ending with guerilla or insurgency warfare in case of armed conflict and occupation. In theory, civil defense is designed to play a critical role in the total defense approach. The concept, however, is not yet operationalized to support comprehensive state defense. In 1991, Estonian political and military stakeholders recognized the importance of civil resistance. Bruce Jenkins notes that,

In a meeting in Toompea Castle, then Minister of State Raivo Vare (deputy prime minister and acting defense minister) expressed his view of nonviolent resistance as a part of a ‘total defense’ system and as a ‘second stage’ in a defense struggle. The Estonian military Chief of Staff, Mr. Ants Laaneots, agreed that nonviolent resistance was necessary in the event of a massive attack, but felt that it should be combined with types of guerrilla warfare.⁶

At the end of 1993, Christopher Kruegler, president of the Albert Einstein Institution, noted the potential path for small states like Estonia:

Many small states like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, where the AEI [Albert Einstein Institution] has been especially active, are certainly not going to put all their security eggs in the basket of civilian-based defense. But they are going to continue thoughtful and deliberate development of the CBD [Civilian Based Defense] alternative as a component of their overall strategy, and we are going to continue to be with them as they carry on in that direction.⁷

Krueger’s argument about the potential of civil defense for small states has been partially realized after two decades. Estonia, as a small state, has implemented a comprehensive national defense approach through the Integrated National Defense Concept and National Defense Strategy. Estonia’s need for integrated national defense is explained here:

⁶ Bruce Jenkins, “Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics,” *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution* III, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92): 5, <http://www.aeinsteinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/nvs-vol.-3-no.3.pdf>.

⁷ Christopher Kruegler, “The Development of Civilian Based Defense,” *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from the Albert Einstein Institution*, Special Double Issue (Fall 1993/Winter 1994): 4, http://www.aeinsteinst.org/organizations/org/16_fall93_win94-1.pdf.

An integrated approach to national defense represents one of the most important principles for the implementation of Estonian defense policies. According to the approach observed by the Riigikogu [Parliament], the pooled efforts of [the] whole state will be implemented to ensure Estonia's security in the event of a military threat. Therefore, national defense has a scope that extends beyond military defense and which also involves international activities, civil sector support to military national defense, psychological defense, ensuring domestic security, and the consistence of vital services—regardless of the threat scenario.⁸

The integrated state defense approach heavily emphasizes non-military actions. At the same time, the National Security Concept defines civil mobilization as a critical part of success. The 2010 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (NSC) states the following:

National defense

To prevent and repel military action against Estonia all capabilities will be used pursuant to the principle of total defense, including the efforts of state structures and the population.⁹ In case of military action against Estonia, the national defense system will be implemented comprehensively, consisting of military defense, civil contribution to military defense, international activity, ensuring of internal security, securing the resilience of critical services, and psychological defense. Estonia is continuously preparing for national defense, and will defend itself in any circumstance and against an enemy of any superiority. National defense is organized following the principles of civilian control.¹⁰

⁸ *Estonian Ministry of Defense*, under “Defense Policy,” last updated April 7, 2014, <http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/defence-policy>.

⁹ According to the former chief of defense 2005–2011, General Ants Laaneots: “Total defense means that the mental, physical, economic and other potential of government structures, local governments, defense forces and the entire nation must be in a continual state of preparedness to manage a situation of crisis and to act as one in order to prevent and avert danger or attack and to preserve the nation. There are five components to total defense: psychological defense, civil defense, economic defense, civil preparedness and military defense.... Civil defense means a set of non-military defensive functions performed in the event of crisis or war, the objectives of which are: preservation of the functions of the government (maintaining the operation of the *Riigikogu* [Parliament], the government and local government agencies, and of the legal system, and guaranteeing public order), protection of the population and the property of the population and of the state, the provision and guaranteeing of essential services and consumer goods for the population, minimizing of the effects of the enemy’s attacks on the society, and dealing with emergencies created as a result thereof [MDSE].” *Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia*, “Total Defense,” last modified February 10, 2012, http://www.estonica.org/en/National_defence_system/Total_defence/.

¹⁰ *Estonian Ministry of Defense*, “National Security Concept of Estonia,” unofficial translation, 13, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/nodes/9470_National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf.

The concept strongly emphasizes civilian aspects of national defense, referred to as “civil contribution to military defense.”

In this rapidly evolving security environment, the most serious potential threats to Estonia derive from hybrid and combined challenges and from a combination of internal and external developments. Therefore, national defense can no longer be limited to military defense alone. Only a comprehensive approach to defense can guarantee a country’s security. Based on this central idea, the 2011 National Defense Strategy stipulates that all major Estonian state authorities shall participate in national defense, thus combining military forces with non-military capabilities.¹¹

The National Defense Strategy includes six courses of action including “civilian sector support to military action.”¹² The National Defense Strategy, however, provides little guidance on how to operationalize nonmilitary capabilities such as civil resistance. Estonian military officials have failed to study whether social movement theory could help bridge this void.

Civil resistance, even when it is unarmed, can be a powerful force. According to Mohandas Gandhi (Mahatma), “This force gains its strength from the fact that even the most powerful cannot rule without the co-operation of the ruled.”¹³ In other words, civil resistance would fill the gap and make military defense more comprehensive. By incorporating civil resistance, the Estonian total defense concept can strengthen national security and be an indirect strategy to deter future aggressions.

At the same time, it is strategically clever to combine civil resistance with violent struggle. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan highlight the strategic power of civil resistance when combining it with violent struggle. Chenoweth and Stephan state, “Our perspective does not assume that nonviolent resistance methods can melt the hearts of repressive regimes or dictators. Instead, we argue that as with some successful violent

¹¹ Estonian Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” 3, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/KM_riigikaitse_strateegia_eng%282%29.pdf.

12 Ibid., 10.

13 Maciej J. Bartkowski et al., “Recovering Nonviolent History,” in *Recovering Nonviolent History, Civil Resistance In Liberation Struggles*, ed. Maciej J. Bartowski (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 3.

movements, nonviolent campaigns can impose costly sanctions on their opponents, resulting in strategic gains.”¹⁴

Little systematic research, however, has been done to synthesize civil resistance with comprehensive national defense. This thesis posits that social movement theory has much to offer to operationalize civil defense and civil preparedness.

B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS

In 1994, Estonian Defense Minister Enn Tupp wrote the foreword to Gene Sharp’s book *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapon System*. Tupp clearly identifies the problem and states, “Our forces are weak and we must use all options available to reinforce and hold our independence. This we must learn and adopt, using stratagems as David with the stubbornness of the Kalev folk.”¹⁵

Since 1994, Estonia has taken a major step forward and is currently implementing a comprehensive approach to state defense. Nevertheless, the strategic potential of civil resistance, which is an irregular method of struggle, has unfortunately not been fully recognized. Therefore, it is not included in comprehensive state defense. The research question and hypotheses in this thesis stem from analysis of the Estonian National Security Concept and National Defense Strategy. The analysis has identified a major gap. Specifically, the use of nonmilitary capabilities in the comprehensive state defense strategy is inadequate. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the strategic potential of civil resistance and to urge its extension onto the irregular battlefield. In particular, this thesis focuses on the primary research question: What are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation?

14 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “The Success of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns,” in *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, ed. Bruce Hoffman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 18.

15 Enn Tupp, foreword to Gene Sharp’s book, *Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapon System*, foreword translated by Margus Kuul, book translated by Tiia Kaare (Tallinn: Infomare, 1994).

C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis employs case studies to examine the relative significance of the hypothesis in two integrated phases. The first part of the analysis identifies a set of requirements for effective civil resistance by analyzing social movement literature and strategic nonviolence literature. Additionally, discussion of principles found in the unconventional warfare literature supplements this analysis. The second part of the analysis uses these principles, identified in Chapter II in four case studies, to test the hypotheses.

The results of the analyses will help establish whether the utility of civil resistance is significant across diverse operational environments. Ultimately, the analyses will validate critical factors for effective civil resistance and the process and sequence of its development.

Case selection is based on two principles. First, the cases encompass the most variation on the outcome of civil resistance in order to isolate those principles closely associated with effectiveness. Effectiveness is tentatively defined by the degree of success achieved. In other words, this thesis will include both successful and unsuccessful cases from the list of civil resistance campaigns included in Appendix A. I use Gene Sharp's definitions for full and partial success. According to Sharp, full success means that "all (or almost all)" of the goals during or soon after the nonviolent struggle have been achieved. Partial success in civil resistance occurs when "only some of those goals are achieved."¹⁶ I consider civil resistance to have failed when no goals have been achieved.

The primary sources for cases are *The Casebook of Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume I and II* and *Why Civil Resistance Works*. Combined, I propose to examine the following cases: The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon (2005, full success), The Singing Revolution in Estonia (1989, full success), The Druze Resistance in Israel (1981, partial success), and The Kosovo Albanian Resistance in Yugoslavia (1981, failure).

¹⁶ Gene Sharp, "Three Ways Success May Be Achieved," in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, ed. Marina Finkelstein (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 2000), 766.

It should be noted that while definitions of civil resistance vary, they all highlight the employment of civilian networks and organizations as a form of warfare. In this regard, this thesis uses the concept of civil resistance defined by Stephan and Chenoweth. They define it as follows: “Civil resistance employs social, psychological, economic, and political methods, including boycotts (social, economic, political), strikes, protests, sit-ins, stay-always, and other acts of civil disobedience and noncooperation to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ sources of power.”¹⁷ In other words, civil resistance is not necessarily, nor always purely, nonviolent or unarmed. Whether civil resistance should be violent or not is a tactical consideration.

Mohandas Gandhi and Gene Sharp recognize civil resistance as a form of warfare. Sharp argues, “In this special type of asymmetrical conflict, the opponent’s violent action is always confronted indirectly, i.e., not by the same type of action in direct confrontation but by nonviolent resistance and intervention.”¹⁸ Similarly, Chenoweth and Stephan state, “We are explicit in conceptualizing civil resistance as a form of unconventional warfare, albeit one that employs different weapons and applies force differently.”¹⁹ Andrew Mack in his writing clearly identifies nonviolent action as a form of unconventional warfare.²⁰ Kurt Schock recognizes civil resistance as asymmetric conflict.²¹

History has shown that civil resistance remains largely less violent, and tends to be more effective than armed insurrections. Sharp noted in 1990 that more movements that employed civil resistance liberated people under communist rule than armed groups sponsored by the Pentagon and CIA.²²

17 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 12.

18 Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 453.

19 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 18.

20 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics*, 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 195, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880>.

21 Kurt Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 277 (2013): 277, doi:10.1177/0022343313476530.

22 Gene Sharp, “The Power and Potential of Nonviolent Struggle,” *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution*, Special Double Issue (Spring, Summer 1990): 3.

Sharp's claim is strongly supported by evidence from various sources. Chenoweth and Stephan in their empirical analysis reach the following conclusions about civil resistance: "From this data, we find support for the perspective that nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior to violent resistance during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries."²³ They add, "Our findings show that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance campaigns."²⁴ It should be noted that Chenoweth and Stephan's work does have a coding issue where they treat civil resistance campaigns as nonviolent. In other words, what they demonstrate is the utility of civil resistance, rather than nonviolent resistance.

Chenoweth and Stephan compared the efficacy of violent and nonviolent campaigns and concluded that, in general, nonviolent movements have a greater chance of success. They also compared and contrasted largely nonviolent campaigns and found that the successful efforts shared a number of critical factors, such as existing social organization, strong leadership and clear strategy. Again, it should be noted that Chenoweth and Stephan label campaigns with mixed violent and nonviolent means as nonviolent as long as they do not use lethal weapons.

In a similar vein, Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman point out that civil resistance played a major role in numerous conflicts over the past three decades. They note, "...The force of civic resistance was a key factor in driving 50 of 67 transitions, or over 70 percent of countries where transitions began as dictatorial systems fell and/or new states arose from the disintegration of multinational states."²⁵

²³ Chenoweth and Stephan analyzed "...323 cases from 1900 to 2006 of major nonviolent and violent campaigns seeking regime change, the expulsion of foreign occupiers, or secession. This research is the first to catalog, compare, and analyze all known cases of major armed and unarmed insurrections during this period." Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 17.

²⁴ Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works, The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer, 2008): 8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40207100>.

²⁵ Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (New York: Freedom House, 2005): 6, <http://agnt.org/snv/resources/HowFreedomisWon.pdf>.

At the same time, it is important to remember that civil resistance has not always been successful. Nonviolent civil resistance failed in South Korea in 1979, Pakistan in 1983, South Africa in 1952–1961, Panama in 1987–1989, China in 1956–1957, Burma in 1988, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Hungary in 1956, Tibet in 1987–1989 and many other places around the world.²⁶ Civil resistance movements have failed for numerous reasons and have often occurred as spontaneous activities. In this context, Michael Nagler argues, “[t]oo often, people try a kind of nonviolence that is unsystematic: they may have the best of intentions, but their nonviolence is of the ‘make-it-up-as-you-go-along’ variety. This is grossly inadequate.”²⁷ This observation highlights that civil resistance works best when it is part of a disciplined strategy.

Many societies and regimes, democratic and nondemocratic, small and large states, have experienced civil resistance against coercive rulers and occupational forces. Despite the success of civil resistance, it has not been emphasized in the context of national defense. At the same time, this often forgotten strategy has frequently proved to be the only viable method of struggle for people under occupation by authoritative regimes.

Examples of civil resistance appear in ancient science and modern fiction. For instance, Russian writer Leo Tolstoy emphasized noncooperation and nonviolence in *The Kingdom of God Is with You*. Henry David Thoreau promoted civil disobedience in his book *Resistance to Civil Government*.²⁸ Another famous American writer, John Steinbeck, illustratively described “people power” and strategic logic behind the civil resistance in his book *The Moon Is Down*.²⁹ Steinbeck describes civil resistance in a small town in 1941 during WWII somewhere in Northern Europe. A small state is rapidly occupied by a coercive regime. The regime is trying to mine the coal from the small

²⁶ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 233–336.

²⁷ Robert J. Burrowes, “Planning and Organizing Nonviolent Defence,” *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 181.

²⁸ Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” 277.

²⁹ People power is defined as, “The power capacity of a mobilized population and its institutions using nonviolent forms of struggle. The term was especially used during the 1986 Philippine nonviolent insurrection.” Albert Einstein Institution, “A Brief Glossary of Nonviolent Struggle,” in *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution* I, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 5.

town's coal mine and thereby secure energy resources for military operations. Unarmed civilians, despite the coercive regime's lethal methods, keep engaging in conflict without firearms. They use largely nonviolent methods and delay coal production. At the end of their campaign, they shift to violent action and use dynamite and sabotage to destroy the coal mine.³⁰ Steinbeck describes the power of civil resistance through conversation between Colonel Lanser, the commander of the occupation force, and local collaborator Corell. Colonel Lanser very clearly understands the hardship and does not underestimate the power of civil resistance. Colonel Lanser states to Corell:

There are no peaceful people. When will you learn it? There are no friendly people. Can't you understand that? We have invaded this country—you, by what they called treachery, prepared for us.... Can't you understand that we are at war with these people?³¹

Colonel Lanser in his own way recognized civil resistance as a strategy of irregular warfare and its dynamic utility against occupation. Civil resistance is a weapon system for people who are militarily inferior to their opponents.

In summary, in this chapter I argued that small states, despite limited military capability, have options and can more effectively defend their sovereignty using irregular approaches. For example, small states can integrate civilian mobilization into state defense. Using Estonia's comprehensive state defense approach as an example, I explained that one option for civilian contributions to national defense could be civil resistance. I found after analyzing the Estonia National Security Concept and the National Defense Strategy that Estonia's comprehensive state defense does not include civil resistance. Nonmilitary capabilities are not effectively used. In this context, I explained that civil resistance is an irregular form of warfare and research has proven that civil resistance can be effective strategy. Based on analysis, I raise the question, *what are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation?*

³⁰ Sharp's conceptual definition of sabotage is "acts of demolition and destruction of property," which he considers inappropriate for nonviolent struggle. Gene Sharp, "Solidarity and Discipline to Fight Repression," *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc. 2005), 390.

³¹ John Steinbeck, *The Moon Is Down* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 35.

In the next chapter, by investigating scholarly research on the subject fields, including social movements and irregular warfare literature, my intent is to summarize and distill characteristics of successful civil resistance. In addition, I propose some hypotheses for further research that are directly distilled from the literature review.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

“Violence works like a hammer, while nonviolence works more like a lever.”³²

—Kurt Schock

Noteworthy contributions to civil resistance research have been made by scholars such as Gene Sharp, Kurt Schock, Peter Ackerman, Christopher Kruegler, Jack Du Vall, Masciej. J. Bartowski, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan. In the social movement field, scholars such as Sidney Tarrow, Joseph Davis, Franscesca Polletta and Robert Bendford give insight into how social movements are related to organization and narrative. The *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volumes I and II* highlights important requirements for irregular warfare, including civil resistance.

First, it must be noted that civil resistance literature reveals a simple misconception. Peter Ackerman and Jack Du Vall state, “The greatest misconception about conflict in our century is that violence is always the ultimate form of power, that no other method of advancing a just cause or defeating injustice can surpass it.”³³ Civil resistance as an irregular strategy of struggle is not always recognized, and therefore, leads to many misconceptions.

In their research, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan “...neither foreign state support, nor international sanctions, nor regime crackdown seem to positively or negatively affect the outcome of nonviolent campaigns.”³⁴ They add, “The vast majority of nonviolent campaigns have emerged in authoritarian regimes where even peaceful opposition against the government may have fatal consequences.”³⁵ At the same time, both scholars maintain “...that violent regime repression reduces the likelihood of campaign success by nearly 35 percent.”³⁶ External, international political and financial

³² Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” 283.

³³ Peter Ackerman and Jack Du Vall, “Nonviolent Power in the Twentieth Century,” *Political Science and Politics* 33, no. 2 (June 2000): 148 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/420882>.

³⁴ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 59.

³⁵ Ibid., 66.

³⁶ Ibid., 68.

support could have positive or negative effects. Chenoweth and Stephan note that external support can create many obstacles like the free-rider problem. Participation decreases when the people feel foreigners will win the fight for them. The population may not support civil resistance if external support comes from an unpopular third party. Based on their research, 90 percent of civil resistance movements that have conducted successful mobilization and that have had popular support did not receive direct financial support from foreigners.³⁷ They conclude, “While foreign support or international sanctions may have been critical in some cases, there is no general pattern indicating that they are necessary for successful campaign outcomes.”³⁸

Chenoweth and Stephan, referring to another study, conclude that “factors such as regime type, level of economic development, literacy rate, factionalism of society along ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines have not had statistically significant impact on the ability of civic movement to achieve success through civil resistance campaigns (Marchant et al. 2008).”³⁹

Chenoweth and Stephan’s work involved the collection of reliable data from 259 campaigns, 80 of them nonviolent.⁴⁰ Based on analysis of NAVCO dataset, they found that domestic mass participation is paramount for success.⁴¹ Mass participation is linked to social networks. These scholars emphasize the importance of social networks because they create critical social ties among the people.⁴² These scholars also cite the importance of the number and quality of participants, and actions that can create a loyalty shift within the opposition regime.⁴³ Chenoweth and Stephan have discovered that high numbers of participants are more likely to induce defections among security forces.⁴⁴ According to their analysis, the number and quality of participants are equally important, and

³⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 54–55.

³⁸ Ibid., 59.

³⁹ Ibid., 63–64.

⁴⁰ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 31.

⁴¹ Ibid., 30.

⁴² Ibid., 40.

⁴³ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 30–41.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 48.

participants must maintain a high discipline of nonviolence.⁴⁵ Researchers agree that a violent reaction from a coercive regime may backfire and propel a civil resistance movement. They conclude that when a regime violently suppresses civil resistance, and the movement remains nonviolent, the likelihood of success rises by approximately 22 percent.⁴⁶

In addition, they have found that “as with any campaign, strategic factors like achieving unity around shared goals and methods, establishing realistic goals, assessing opponent vulnerabilities and sources of leverage, sequencing tactics, and navigating structural constraints including regime repression are also likely to be crucial determinants of campaign outcomes.”⁴⁷ In summary, the research of Chenoweth and Stephan indicates that the following factors are critical: mass participation, social networks, quality and quantity of participants, regime loyalty shift, backfire effect, and security force detection, as well as maintenance of a nonviolent strategy, discipline, unity, clear goals, opponent vulnerabilities and leveraging.⁴⁸

Sharp, the leading scholar on civil resistance theory, found that a nonviolent strategy is paramount in civil resistance.⁴⁹ He recommends an indirect approach using nonviolent methods against an overwhelmingly powerful opponent.⁵⁰ Sharp describes how such a strategy combines all crucial factors and key elements, such as indirect approach, geographical and physical elements, timing, numbers and strength, initiative, and choice of available weapons and tactics.⁵¹

Sharp explains that civil resistance does not happen spontaneously; resistance leaders must plan and initiate events. Consistent with conventional military thinking, he considers the exercise of leadership in every stage of civil resistance to be very

⁴⁵ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 39.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 51.

⁴⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 40–41.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 41–58.

⁴⁹ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 493–494.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 495–496.

⁵¹ Ibid., 492–509.

important.⁵² He also notes that the opponents often attempt to remove movement leaders although “nonviolent struggle does not need a charismatic leader.”⁵³ Sharp considers broad expertise in nonviolent struggle and strategic nonviolent consciousness to be more important. Leaders can be individuals or groups.⁵⁴ Sharp echoes Gandhi, who argued that civil resistance campaigns should be led by leaders “who believed nonviolence as a moral principle.”⁵⁵ Sharp adds, “...the maintenance of high quality [high discipline] in nonviolent action is necessary at all stages; if it is done when the numbers are small, it will make possible a very considerable increase in the numbers of nonviolent actionists capable of the strength necessary for effectiveness.”⁵⁶

Sharp believes high numbers of participants in civil resistance movements could determine the outcome.⁵⁷ Large numbers, however, do not guarantee success. They could be a disadvantage when a crowd is not controlled and does not maintain nonviolent discipline.⁵⁸ Sharp adds that it is important for a resistance organization to make use of what he calls ‘pillars of support,’ such as “trade unions, business organizations, religious organizations, the bureaucracy, neighborhoods, villages, cities, regions and the like....”⁵⁹

Among the pillars of support, Sharp emphasizes the importance of defection, especially defection of security forces.⁶⁰ The regime, having not been able to suppress civil resistance, usually demands the security forces use violence and even lethal methods to suppress civil resistance. Lethal methods against civilians can cause unrest among the security forces and disobedience because of social and family ties. When the regime’s

⁵² Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 462.

⁵³ Gene Sharp, “Developing a Realistic Alternative to War and Other Violence,” in *There are Realistic Alternatives* (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2003), 9, <http://www.aeinsteinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/TARA.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 364.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 465.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 478.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 498.

⁵⁸ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 498.

⁵⁹ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 35.

⁶⁰ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 667–669.

security forces start changing sides, the regime is obviously weakened, and the resistance effort gains significant credibility.

Sharp's fundamental contribution in this field is his explanation of how civil resistance works in theory, what the critical requirements for successful civil resistance are and how civil resistance could be operationalized in practice. Through practical examples, he concluded that crucial components in civil resistance include strategy, leadership, nonviolent discipline, organization, planning, nonviolent action and participation by a high number of qualified participants.

In a similar vein, Kurt Schock concludes that successful civil resistance efforts must have clear and limited goals. He states, "...the goals of movements should be well chosen, clearly defined, and understood by all parties to the conflict."⁶¹ In addition, he recognizes that successful civil resistance movements must have oppositional consciousness and organization.⁶² For Schock, "oppositional consciousness is open-ended, nontotalizing, and respectful of diversity, and it facilitates the mobilization of a broad-based opposition."⁶³ This consciousness is often created and expanded by strategic framing and narrative.

According to Schock, decentralized network-like organizations have a better chance of surviving repression.⁶⁴ He refers to "multiple channels of resistance," which are successful only when "non-institutional pressure" is used.⁶⁵ He appears to be referring to the strategy that is utilized by and through social networks. Another important factor for Schock is efficient employment of different nonviolent methods. He specifies protest, persuasion and intervention.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Kurt Schock, "Trajectories of Unarmed Insurrections," in *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, Volume 22, ed. Bert Klandermans (London:University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 164.

⁶² Ibid., 165–166.

⁶³ Ibid., 165.

⁶⁴ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, 49–50.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 165.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 167.

Schock also notes the importance of tactical innovation such as shifting methods and making use of different spaces and places. He considers the concentration and dispersal of civil resistance activity to be important.⁶⁷ He also emphasizes the importance of communication, through media and third-party entities, as critical strategic elements.⁶⁸ For example, civil resistance in Burma in the 1960s, China in the 1980s and Poland in the late 1980s used alternative or underground press for political mobilization. The regimes restricted access to public media. International media coverage of ongoing civil resistance created third-party support in South Africa, Nepal and Thailand.⁶⁹

Schock echoes other scholars on the need to cause defections among state security forces, especially in cases of civil resistance.⁷⁰ He says the backfiring effect has a crucial connection to tactical action and nonviolent discipline. Both factors, wisely used, increase the likelihood of a backfiring effect.⁷¹ Backfiring effect is where regime repression leads people to more mobilization against coercive regimes.

While Schock stresses the need for a clear overall strategy, he also emphasizes the usefulness of shifting strategy from nonviolent to violent and vice versa. He notes that leaders and followers must understand and think at a strategic level.⁷² Again, it should be emphasized that civil resistance is not equal to the complete absence of violent tactics. Schock's critical elements include goals, opposition consciousness, organization, strategy, methods, security forces detection, backfiring, nonviolent discipline, strategy and leadership.

In his research, Schock has come to conclude that civil resistance success or failure clearly depends on certain requirements. In addition, he has found that success is related to overall strategic consciousness and wise use of available civil resistance methods during the resistance.

⁶⁷ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, 167–168.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 169.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 169–170.

⁷⁰ Schock, “The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” 284.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

Maria Stephan has researched Middle East civil resistance campaigns. Stephan concludes that the three key principles of successful resistance are “unity, strategic planning, and nonviolent discipline.”⁷³ She notes that civil resistance cells must be united and have clear goals and strategies created by the leadership. In the view of Stephan, nonviolent discipline has a direct link to loyalty shift.⁷⁴ In summary, Stephan emphasizes critical factors like clear goals, strategy, leadership, nonviolent discipline and regime loyalty shift.

Scholars such as Peter Ackerman and Berel Rodal also have identified three crucial but somewhat different elements: planning, nonviolent discipline and leadership.⁷⁵ In their view, the leadership should focus on creating solidarity and defining achievable goals.⁷⁶ Explaining the importance of planning, Ackerman and Rodal emphasize tactics and strategy.

With Christopher Krueger, Ackerman researched six case studies to find factors common to successful civil resistance. They offer principles for successful civil resistance, but similar factors also were in place within stalemated and unsuccessful resistance efforts. In a broad sense, all resistance movements—successful or failed—made use of identifiable factors like objective, organization, general strategy, and nonviolent discipline.⁷⁷

⁷³ Maria J. Stephan, “What Lessons about Strategic Nonviolent Action Can Be Distilled from Cases Discussed in This Book? How Does Skillful Civil Resistance Relate to Democratic Development?” in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 311.

⁷⁴ Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 311–314.

⁷⁵ Peter Ackerman and Berel Rodal, “The Strategic Dimensions of Civil Resistance,” *Global Politics and Strategy* 50, no. 3 (2008): 117–120, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330802173131>.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 117–118.

⁷⁷ Ackerman and Krueger, “Conclusion,” in *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (London: Praeger, 1984), 311.

Masciej J. Bartowski's quantitative research of 15 case studies from Africa to Europe reveals many of the same crucial factors, including strategy, nonviolent discipline, organization, coalition building, unity, and resilience. In addition, he explains how organizations reflect the important role of leaders in civil resistance.⁷⁸

The U.S. Army manual, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume I and II*, explores 46 violent and nonviolent revolutions across the world between 1933 and 2006. It focuses on factors that describe the form and characteristics of revolutionary warfare, but the research framework does not explain why these factors are important. The analysis reveals that success or failure of resistance depends on “objectives, its leadership and organization, its operations, communications, interactions with the surrounding population, and the government’s response.”⁷⁹

Sidney Tarrow in his social movement research puts more emphasis on the importance of narrative, in the context of social networks and political opportunities.⁸⁰ Narrative gives meaning to action. His view is that the narrative legitimizes the movement and its actions. As Tarrow explains, “All movements’ leaders proffer symbolically laden messages to gain support from followers, attract fence sitters, and mark themselves off from opponents.”⁸¹ Tarrow correctly argues that all movements gain success because of existing social networks and organizations.⁸² The importance of narrative can hardly be overstated. Numerous scholars, including Joseph E. Davis, consider it crucial in civil resistance.⁸³ Narrative as a critical factor is not mentioned directly by most scholars. It should be.

⁷⁸ Bartkowski, *Recovering Nonviolent History*, 339–352.

⁷⁹ United States Army Special Operations Command and Johns Hopkins University, “Purpose of the Casebook,” in *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II, 1962–2009*, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg: U.S. SOCOM, 2010), viii–x.

⁸⁰ Sidney G. Tarrow, “Networks and Organizations,” in *Power in Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, ed. Margaret Levi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 120.

⁸¹ Ibid., 142.

⁸² Ibid., 183.

⁸³ Joseph E. Davis, in *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*, ed. Joseph E. Davis (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).

Social movement scholars consider narrative a very important requirement. Storytelling is part of our society and every civil resistance movement has a narrative that includes grievances and messages to justify its demands and goals. Joseph Davis explains that stories “create and strengthen movement community and collective identity.”⁸⁴ Francesca Polletta argues that the story initiates recruitment before civil resistance organizations are created, ignites emotions and creates or blocks emerging strategic opportunities.⁸⁵ Robert Bendford notes that narrative is an important control mechanism for social control in civil resistance.⁸⁶

An excellent example of powerful master narrative is Pope Urban II’s speech in 1095 at the Council of Clermont in France, which started the first Crusade. He called on Christians to fight for the Holy Land in Jerusalem.⁸⁷

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL CIVIL RESISTANCE

As many scholars note, civil resistance campaigns can have unique characteristics. A great many of them, however, also share a few general factors. The characteristics for success identified here are based on historical examples of civil resistance campaigns. The literature reveals several characteristics associated with success. These characteristics are listed in Table 1 and are explained in turn.

⁸⁴ Davis, *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*, 25.

⁸⁵ Francesca Polletta, “Plotting Protest,” in *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*, ed. Joseph E. Davis (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 33.

⁸⁶ Robert D. Benford, “Controlling Narratives and Narratives as Control within Social Movements,” in *Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements*, ed. Joseph E. Davis (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 53.

⁸⁷ *Internet Medieval Sourcebook*, “Urban II: Speech at Council of Clermont, 1095, according to Fulcher of Chartres,” <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2-fulcher.html>.

Table 1. Characteristics of Successful Civil Resistance

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organization and social networks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High participation level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Narrative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regime loyalty shift 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doctrine
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy 	

1. Leadership

Leaders create strategies and campaign plans to shape the movement. Some civil resistance leaders such as Gandhi had a strong belief in nonviolence. That does not mean that their campaigns always remained nonviolent despite their best efforts. Nevertheless, successful civil resistance leaders must understand the strategic utility of nonviolence in politically undermining a coercive opponent and shifting opponents. Even so, it should not be a blind commitment to inaction or nonviolence.

2. Participation Level

High participation level means the capability to mobilize people for civil resistance. Large movements have ability to undermine a coercive regime's political power. High participation creates legitimacy and makes recruitment easier. High levels of participation are typically aided by pre-existing organizations and social networks.

3. Loyalty Shift

Regime loyalty shift means that security forces loyal to the regime defect. Loyalty shift is related to factors such as coercion and backfiring effect. Loyalty shift can occur when the regime is using violence against mass-based civil resistance. Violence, in turn, can cause backfiring effect. Mobilization against a coercive opponent is increasing.

4. Strategy

Strategy is a paramount requirement for successful civil resistance. In this category, I include methods of struggle, goals and strategic planning. It is important to have a strategic plan from the beginning although it can—and sometimes must—be adjusted during the course of the campaign. It is critical to note that civil resistance is the strategy and must not be confused with the doctrine of nonviolence and discipline, which is another critical requirement for effective civil resistance. Nonviolent strategy involves numerous unconventional methods of struggle (see Appendix A).

5. Organization and Social Networks

Existing organizations and social networks provide numerous resources that can increase the effectiveness of unarmed civil resistance. Such resources include organizational identity, structure and infrastructure, publicly accepted individual activists, kinship, private and media ties, interorganizational relations, communication channels and links, and expertise on how to conduct publicly influential collective events.

6. Narrative

Strong and powerful narratives of vilification, victimization and injustice mobilize people to act against injustice. It is not uncommon that the occupier destroys and suppresses the occupied country's national cultural identity, language and national glory. Effective civil resistance must have meaning—the narrative. Eric Hoffner writes in this vein, “Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil.”⁸⁸

7. Doctrine

A doctrine of nonviolence is a set of principles, including discipline, planning, and tactics. While civil resistance can deploy defensive violence, it is paramount that it retain its legitimacy by appearing nonviolent until the regime uses excessive violence. Doctrine provides a constructive program and evaluation system to maintain civil

⁸⁸ Eric Hoffer, “Unified Agents,” in *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper Collins, 2011), 91.

resistance discipline. The main effect of the incremental and proportional action is to induce the adversary to use disproportional violence. Disproportional violence, in turn, can create more popular and moral support for the resistance movement. Once the movement has increasing popular support and moral resonance, it becomes easier for it to sustain itself against the more powerful adversary.

These characteristics identified in the literature review help to answer the research question, *what are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation?* In addition, the proposed primary and supportive hypotheses are drawn directly from the characteristics of successful civil resistance discussed earlier.

B. PRIMARY AND SUPPORTING HYPOTHESES

Effective civil resistance can be a critical part of the strategy for total defense under occupation. My supporting hypotheses are:

- a. Civil Resistance needs decentralized leadership to be successful.
- b. The higher the participation level, the greater the effectiveness of civil resistance.
- c. Increased civil resistance success is directly related to regime loyalty shift.
- d. Civil resistance can be an effective component of total defense when civil resistance is integrated with and nested within a broader strategy.
- e. Civil resistance is more effective when it is embedded in existing independent and social networks and organizations.
- f. A narrative based on national glorification, victimization, and targeted vilification of the enemy can motivate and sustain effective civil defense.
- g. A doctrine of incremental and proportional violence through primarily unarmed means can increase the effectiveness of civil defense.

III. THE CEDAR REVOLUTION IN LEBANON, 2005

A. INTRODUCTION

Syria's three decades of military and political intervention in Lebanon was ended in the spring of 2005 by ordinary Lebanese people. The Cedar Revolution represents Lebanon's remarkable political victory over Syria's de facto occupation. The political victory was achieved entirely through highly disciplined, unarmed civil resistance.

1. Significance of the Case

After years of violent struggle against Syrian hegemony, the Lebanese people and the international community witnessed highly disciplined unarmed civil resistance. "The scope, intensity, and distinctly nonviolent character of the civilian uprising, referred to as the Cedar Revolution or the 'independence intifada,' was unprecedented in Lebanese history."⁸⁹

Two characteristics are noteworthy in the Cedar Revolution. First, it was extraordinary that the Lebanese people managed to unite religiously and ethnically diverse communities. Second, the movement was a result of a concerted organizational effort to maintain a strategy of civil resistance.

The civil resistance movement maintained a broad political coalition and operational sustainability at the strategic level almost from the start of the struggle. Rudy Jaagar and Maria Stephan point out, "Over the course of approximately two months, what had begun as relatively small, spontaneous protests quickly developed into an organized, broad-based opposition movement that would lead to the resignation of the prime minister and the withdrawal of Syrian forces, which had occupied Lebanon for almost 30 years."⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Rudy Jaagar and Maria J. Stephan, "Lebanon's Independence Intifada: How an Unarmed Insurrection Expelled Syrian Forces," in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 169.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

2. Synopsis

After the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1976, Syria deployed troops in Lebanon. The civil war came to an end in 1989, negotiated by the Saudis through the Ta'if Convention. For Syria, “Lebanon had long been a base for Syrian opposition to Assad; it was an ideal place of exile for political enemies, where they could have considerable freedom and be near Syria.”⁹¹ In 2000, President Hāfiẓ Assad died. Syria’s long-time control weakened in Lebanon and was challenged by increasing agitation.⁹²

In August of 2001, Beirut saw unarmed insurrection angered by Syrian occupation. Undercover agents arrested 250 demonstrators and attempted to suppress demonstrations. Hundreds of Free Patriotic Movement members along with the opposition, mainly various Christian parties, protested against Syria’s domination.⁹³

A few years later, in the autumn of 2004, Rafiq Hariri, prime minister of Lebanon at that time, met Syria’s President Bashar Assad. Assad ordered Hariri to guarantee Lebanese President Emil Lahoud’s reelection. For President Assad, it was critical to continue the same politics, because Syrian leadership recognized Lahoud as the person accustomed to maintaining cooperative relations with the Syrian leadership based on mutual trust. It was a convenient option to Syria, since Lahoud was a weak president with no real power base within Lebanon.⁹⁴

Hariri understood that his decision to resist openly against the pro-Syrian Lebanese government and Assad could end fatally. In September 2004, Hariri’s opposition to President Lahoud was at its highest point because Lahoud’s presidential reign was about come to an end. The Lebanese Parliament, however, influenced by Syria, amended the constitution to extend his term by three years.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Umar F. Abd-Allah, “The Regime of Hāfiẓ Assad, The Lebanon Intervention, 1976,” in *The Islamic Struggle in Syria* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 79.

⁹² Jaagar and Stephen, *Civilian Jihad*, 170.

⁹³ Ibid., 70.

⁹⁴ Eyal Zisser, “Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution—Between Continuity and Change,” *Orient-Hamburg* 47, no. 4 (2006): 465.

⁹⁵ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 171.

Hariri resigned in autumn 2004 in protest of Lahoud's reelection. The next year, he sent his Future Movement Party representatives to an opposition meeting held at the Bristol Hotel.⁹⁶ It turned out to be a decisive moment for future civil resistance.

Hariri was assassinated on February 14, 2005, along with bystanders, when a huge car bomb exploded in Beirut. The bomb contained at least 1200 kg of explosives.⁹⁷ According to Jaafar and Stephan, "Hariri's assassination united large segments of the Lebanese population in grief and anger against their government and the Syrian regime."⁹⁸ With unarmed insurrections directed against Syria and the Lebanese government increasing, opposition leaders gathered on February 18 at the Bristol Hotel and announced their demands:⁹⁹

The immediate and total withdrawal of Syrian troops, the resignation of the government led by Prime Minister Omar Karami, and the holding of three parliamentary elections. Their demands were clear, specific, and the same ones being made by the Lebanese rallying in the streets. At the press conference following the meeting, opposition spokesperson Samir Frangieh, wearing a red and white scarf around his neck, announced the start of a 'peaceful and democratic intifada for independence.'¹⁰⁰

Lebanese students, who played a major role in the Cedar Revolution, exhibited boldness through their action, which directly affected the course of the revolution.

On the same evening, a group of Lebanese students belonging to opposition parties raised a tent in Martyrs' Square. Taking a cue from the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, these Lebanese protestors decided to build a permanent camp on the site. After the overnight sit-in on 18 February, other political factions and civil society groups quickly followed suit, erecting more tents. The area, dubbed Freedom camp, became the opposition's hub during the popular uprising.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 171.

⁹⁷ Nicholas Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 151.

⁹⁸ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 171.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 172.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

On February 18, opposition spokesperson Samir Frangieh announced that people should start ““peaceful and democratic intifada for independence.’...One Lebanese analyst wrote that the announcement ‘psychologically liberated the Lebanese people from thirty years of servitude. The process of self-liberation began and there was no turning back.”¹⁰²

After February 18, a strong relationship emerged between the Lebanese people and the leaders of the Bristol gathering. The result was creation of leadership that was dedicated to strategic planning on how to expand the civil resistance.¹⁰³

Three days later, Beirut was flooded with some 70,000 demonstrators who carried posters proclaiming “Independence ‘05” and “The Truth.”¹⁰⁴ On February 26, demonstrators built a ‘human chain’ linking Hariri’s assassination site to his burial plot.¹⁰⁵ The unarmed resistance movement quickly gained momentum and paralyzed the state apparatus. “Also at this point, a growing coalition of groups...called for a general nationwide strike and mass rally in Martyrs’ Square on 28 February.”¹⁰⁶ A social boycott was underway.

The Lebanese government, now anticipating a potential mass demonstration, forbade all mass gatherings on February 27, 2005. The head of the Army announced that people must stop the insurrection and disperse by the next day. Military and police forces, en masse, surrounded Martyrs’ Square and the main roads of Beirut. Checkpoints were established. The Lebanese government clearly understood what could happen next.

Lebanese politicians and people joined forces and challenged the government. The nonviolent movement in Beirut was broadcast on TV, which inspired people from all over the country to join with demonstrators. The Lebanese people gathered in Martyrs’

¹⁰² Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 172.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 172.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 174.

¹⁰⁵ Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon*, 154.

¹⁰⁶ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 174.

Square and outnumbered army and police forces. The people maintained nonviolent discipline and filled the security forces' gun barrels with flowers.

Beirut was teeming with demonstrators, who demanded President Lahoud's reassignment and withdrawal of the Syrian troops. On February 28, 2005, Lebanon's government followed the lead of pro-Syrian Sunni leader Umar Karami and stepped down.¹⁰⁷

Lebanese Shi'a Muslims initiated peaceful demonstrations after President Bashar Assad announced the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Nonviolent demonstrations were mainly organized by groups like Hezbollah and Amal. Hezbollah saw the revolutionary opposition defeating the pro-Syrian government and felt it necessary to come to its defense.¹⁰⁸

Hezbollah organized meetings on March 8 near Martyrs' Square, where hundreds of thousands of demonstrators expressed support for Syria. At the same time, the Hezbollah leadership stated that UN Resolution 1559 was not valid.¹⁰⁹ UN Resolution 1559 demanded free elections and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.¹¹⁰

The coalition was surprised by Hezbollah's demonstration and organized a counter demonstration four days later. The coalition insisted on a highly disciplined nonviolent demonstration. "Lebanese of all ages, religions, socioeconomic backgrounds, and political affiliations poured into Beirut. (Again, however, a Shi'a presence was lacking.) No flags were burned, rocks thrown, or clashes with security forces."¹¹¹

The demonstration on March 14, 2005 involved 1.2 million Lebanese.¹¹² It demonstrated that the Lebanese people were capable of uniting in order to show their

¹⁰⁷ Zisser, "Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution," 460.

¹⁰⁸ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 175.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559, "Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There," February 9, 2004, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm>.

¹¹¹ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 176.

¹¹² Rita Stephan, "Leadership of Lebanese Women in the Cedar Revolution," in *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, ed. Faegheh Shirazi (Austin: University of Texas), 177–178.

grievances to the pro-Syrian government. The last Syrian soldier left Lebanese soil on April 26. On May 5, the United Nations confirmed that Lebanon was free from occupying forces. Now Lebanon was preparing for its first free elections since 1990.¹¹³

Soon after the end of Syrian occupation, Cedar Revolution coalition members began fighting among themselves over political power. Eyal Zisser notes pointedly that “...the political forces standing behind the spring 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’ were not made of one cloth....”¹¹⁴ Zisser writes in the same context that the political situation in Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution and parliamentary elections stayed basically the same.¹¹⁵

B. ANALYSIS

A close study of the Cedar Revolution yields several interesting answers as to why it succeeded.

1. Leadership

Several sect leaders established a short-term political coalition. They managed to unite because they shared grievances against the Lebanese government and Syrian regime. Despite a decades-long political opposition, resistance leaders were able to unite quickly because they were able to use existing channels of communication in religious communities. Pre-established sectarian networks helped them unite against a common enemy. Jaafar and Stephan note:

The unpopular extension of Lahoud’s mandate galvanized opposition forces and led to the formation of the Committee for the Defense of the Constitution and Defense of the Republic, which included the Qornet Shehwan coalition, the Jumblat-led Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Democratic Left Party, and others. The committee, later called the Bristol Gathering, after the hotel where leaders met, formed the backbone of an opposition that became the driving force [of] the independence intifada.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 176.

¹¹⁴ Zisser, “Lebanon—the Cedar Revolution,” 464.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 482.

¹¹⁶ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 171.

The sects were never united under one organization and leadership as happened during the Cedar Revolution. The think tank *La Chamber Noire* (the black room) enabled opposition leaders to organize, plan and lead strategic-level unarmed civilian resistance.¹¹⁷

The core members of this planning circle, each representing a political wing of the opposition, included, in addition to Farroukh, Samir Kassir, a leader of the Democratic Left Party, a journalist for al-Nahar, and a vehement critic of the Syrian presence in Lebanon; Ziad Majed, another leader in the Democratic Left Party; Samir Abdelmalak, a spokesperson for the Qornet Shehwan group; and Gibran Tueni, a member of parliament and owner of al-Nahar. Others joined the group on an ad-hoc basis, including representatives of the FPM (until Michel Aoun's return from exile). This operational corps would play a crucial role in the nonviolent struggle.¹¹⁸

2. High Participation Level

From 2000 to 2005, Syrian dominance over the Lebanese increased, leading to a corresponding increase in civil resistance. In response to increased censorship and arrests of opposition members, various Lebanese Christian parties mounted a demonstration in August 2001, resulting in mass arrests. At that time, the fragmented Lebanese opposition concluded that the key to success was coalition building.¹¹⁹ A year later, the government banned MTV [Music Television] broadcasts after interviews with a leading former Lebanese army commander, dissident-in-exile Michel Aoun.¹²⁰ In 2004, the presidential election kept people in political turmoil.

The movement, at its peak in 2005, recorded more than one million participants.¹²¹ The Lebanese Shi'a Muslims organized counter demonstrations, but could not match the opposition's participation level. Opposition mobilization allowed for the occupation of strategic and symbolic public places such as Martyrs' Square. The government and the security forces had been politically outmaneuvered.

¹¹⁷ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 172.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 170.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Rita Stephan, *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, 178.

It is important to note that during the Cedar Revolution, most Lebanese women acted like peaceful revolutionary force multipliers. Nora Jumblat, well known in public as the wife of Druze leader Walid Jumblat, demonstrated this characteristic when she joined with young protesters to conduct a nonviolent march to Martyrs' Square. She even invited the media to broadcast the event.¹²² Rita Stephan writes, "By openly mingling with the men protesting in the streets, by contributing to key aspects of the movements in terms of planning, and by organizing their own demonstrations, these women in essence added a 'feminine' element to resistance."¹²³

3. Regime Loyalty Shift

During the Cedar Revolution, the Lebanese security forces remained neutral.¹²⁴ Police and army units had social, sectarian and family ties with the demonstrators. The civil resistance gained the sympathy of many members of the security forces. To use violence against large numbers of peaceful protesters could be politically too costly. High levels of participation reduced the chance that security forces members would engage in conflict against their friends and family members.¹²⁵

4. Strategy

The Cedar Revolution leadership utilized clear strategy and strategic planning. The strategy included clear achievable demands and creation of a timeline that established a sense of urgency among the resistance membership. The civil resistance central slogan was "Independence '05." The Lebanese flag and national anthem were used to reflect symbolic unity of the resistance movement. The company Quantum Communications conducted targeted political communication and marketing on the behalf of the civil resistance movement. The student camp at Martyrs' Square was logically supported by *La Chamber Noire*. The leadership created a bank account to

¹²² Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 171.

¹²³ Rita Stephan, *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, 175.

¹²⁴ Erica Chenoweth, "Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying 'Why Civil Resistance Works,'" 110, <http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 174.

support ongoing resistance.¹²⁶ The opposition decided to blame the Lebanese and Syrian governments for killing Hariri.¹²⁷

The strategy featured a diversity of tactics. They included nonviolent protest, noncooperation and nonviolent intervention. Demonstrators conducted student strikes and walk-outs, gave public speeches, signed public statements, organized political mourning and demonstrative funerals, held protest meetings, boycotted legislative bodies, refused to accept appointed officials and committed other symbolic public acts.

5. Organization

The Cedar Revolution relied on long-established sectarian, anti-Syrian social movements and religious organizations. Saleh Farroukh, director-general of the Beirut Association for Development, took note of a small working group established in 1988 by Hariri, known as *La Chamber Noire*. This working group “began initiating the general plan of the movement,” exploring “how to ensure the continuity of this intifada to reach the objective of getting Syria out.”¹²⁸

The Cedar Revolution organization was decentralized. It consisted of *La Chamber Noire* and student organizations, which created the Freedom Camp at Martyrs’ Square, which was a defining element of the revolution. The students were supported by *La Chamber Noire* and represented all nine political opposition parties.¹²⁹

6. Narrative

Victimization, in the form of Hariri’s assassination, was a main part of the Cedar Revolution master narrative. Hariri’s assassination story was a prime example of a well-narrated story. Everybody knew the bloody history of politically targeted killing in Lebanon and everyone had experienced decades of national-level victimization. All this made people ready for potential action under emerging leadership.

¹²⁶ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 173–174.

¹²⁷ Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon*, 142.

¹²⁸ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 172.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 171–173.

The Cedar Revolution characterized itself as a victim of Syria's hegemony in Lebanon. Almost everybody, without solid proof, was convinced that "Mr. Lebanon,"¹³⁰ Rafiq Hariri, had been assassinated by the Lebanese government and devil Syrian regime. The assassination of Hariri dramatically advanced the narrative. The people were not restrained about expressing their demands. Political posters depicting Hariri's assassination proclaimed "The Truth," "Independence '05,"¹³¹ "No to Fear and Yes to National Unity," or "Enough Terrorism our People are Fearless."¹³² During a demonstration on March 28, Lebanese women declared, "Every mother, every child, and every heartbeat asks the same question: Where is the Truth?" "We want love, we want peace, and we want truth and freedom."¹³³

7. Doctrine

During the Cedar Revolution, disciplined civil resistance was maintained. How was it possible that almost a million demonstrators accepted a nonviolent strategy? The key to the largely peaceful demonstrations was the successful implementation of nonviolent doctrine, which was well planned and coordinated by the opposition leadership, *La Chambre Noire*. Jaagar and Stephan note that nonviolent activists were informed how to conduct tactical-level nonviolent struggle. An example, "Protestors at Martyrs' Square were instructed that in the event of an attempted assault, they should immediately sit in tight rows, join arms, and form a human chain to make it more difficult for the security forces to carry them away."¹³⁴

¹³⁰ Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon*, 145.

¹³¹ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 175.

¹³² Stephan, *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, 192.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹³⁴ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 175.

Demonstrators were armed with peaceful messages, so “Men, women, and children offered flowers to the soldier, who ignored orders to obstruct the movement of the demonstrators on several occasions.”¹³⁵ The coalition demonstrated their understanding of nonviolent doctrine when they decided to use only one symbol for resistance, the national flag.¹³⁶

One of the opposition leaders, Saleh Farroukh, director-general of the Beirut Association for Social Development, clearly recognized the importance of nonviolent struggle and discipline. Farroukh stated, “Nowadays, the nonviolent struggle is a very important struggle, and a civilized one. [Lebanese] learned from everywhere that violence breeds violence...[V]iolence would make the army turn against you...The Palestinians lost when they moved from a nonviolent to a violent struggle.”¹³⁷

8. Other Factors

A number of lesser factors were nonetheless important to the success of the Cedar Revolution.

Political Opportunity

The death of Syrian President Hāfiz Assad in 2000 weakened the central power and created the political opportunity for mobilization and resistance in Lebanon. Bashar al Assad, Hāfiz’s son, lacked authority even among his own subordinates.¹³⁸ Another external political factor was UN Resolution 1559, which put Syria’s regime in 2004 under international political pressure. It called for free elections and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.¹³⁹ According to the resolution, Syria’s military was an occupying force.

¹³⁵ Stephan, *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, 191.

¹³⁶ Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon*, 154.

¹³⁷ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 172.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹³⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1559 Online, “Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There,” February 9, 2004, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8181.doc.htm>.

Technology and Media

The Cedar Revolution made use of mobile phones, text messages and the Internet as key communication tools to accelerate civil resistance mobilization.¹⁴⁰ Multiple Lebanese and international TV channels, such as CNN, aired the revolution in real time. Jaafar and Stephan note that technology allowed for the movement to create coalitions and gain international support.¹⁴¹ Jaafar and Stephan describe how the political communication company Quantum Communications, led by Eli Khoury, was marketing and messaging news during the revolution.¹⁴² It was quite clear that whoever owned the media “owned” the events of revolution and controlled the narrative and messages. Jaafar and Stephan quote Khoury, “If you win the heart of the media and the heart of the international community, you will win the war. We suffered in the past when we had large numbers of the people demonstrating but failed to win international hearts and minds.”¹⁴³

Internal Financing

Revolutionary activities, violent or nonviolent, need financial assets. The Cedar Revolution was no exception. It was financed largely by Hariri’s family, specifically the Beirut Association for Social Development. It bought flags and other necessities. Lebanese people and rich businessmen also donated money, often anonymously.¹⁴⁴ Rudy Jaagar and Maria J. Stephan note, “In addition to the financial and logistical support from the working group, the tent city was sustained thanks to the generous contributions of thousands of ordinary Lebanese who deposited money into an account set up in the Lebanese Saradar Bank.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Stephan, *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, 191.

¹⁴¹ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 176.

¹⁴² Ibid., 174.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 176.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 173.

C. SUMMARY

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan classified the Cedar Revolution as successful.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the Cedar Revolution meets the requirements for full success described by Gene Sharp. He defines full success as meaning that all or most of the goals during or soon after the nonviolent struggle have been achieved.¹⁴⁷

The Cedar Revolution is a great example of successful civil resistance, where organizers and participants recognized and took advantage of emerging external and internal political opportunities by mobilizing a broad set of existing networks and constructing a nationalist narrative against Syrian influence in Lebanon. Moreover, nonviolent strategy and tactics were used to maintain the movement's legitimacy and popular support.

¹⁴⁶ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 234.

¹⁴⁷ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 766.

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IV. THE SINGING REVOLUTION IN ESTONIA, 1987–1991

A. INTRODUCTION

The Estonian Singing Revolution (1988–1991) is an example of a successful civil resistance secession campaign. Four years of well-organized peaceful and continuous nonviolent struggle at the national level by various political and social actors paved the road for Estonian sovereignty in 1991.

1. Significance of the Case

What makes the Singing Revolution remarkable is that Estonians managed to continuously wage a four-year, nonviolent campaign. It takes its name from the Estonian people's love of group singing. Though patriotic songs were banned during Soviet occupation, participants sang their feelings in a language the Soviets did not understand. Indrek Toome, Secretary of the Central Ideology Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, states that, “Singing was our secret language...this secret language was nonexistent in Russia.”¹⁴⁸

2. Synopsis

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed to lead the Soviet Union. According to an Estonian encyclopedia, Gorbachev's “Perestroika (restructuring) meant reforms in the political and economic system. ...Glasnost (transparency) meant more public information, for example about topical issues, background to political decisions, and mistakes made in the past.”¹⁴⁹

The First Estonian civil movement, the so-called Phosphorus War, was triggered on February 25, 1987, when people watched shocking news from the popular Soviet TV show “Panda.” It revealed Moscow's plan to further develop new phosphorus mines in

¹⁴⁸ Indrek Toome, “Usutlus Indrek Toomega,” [Indrek Toome Interview] in *Eestimaa Laul 88, [The Song of Estonia 88]* ed. Elme Väljaste and Enno Selirand, translated by Margus Kuul (Tallinn: MTÜ Eestimaa Laul, 2011), 217.

¹⁴⁹ *Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia*, “Perestroika and Glasnost,” http://www.estonica.org/en/Perestroika_and_glasnost/.

Estonia and to import tens of thousands of Russian-speaking workers.¹⁵⁰ In response, the Estonians launched nine months of disobedience against the parliament, the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. Armed resistance was never considered.¹⁵¹ The Estonians hoped to protect their environment and avoid the arrival of a new wave of Russian-speaking workers.

On May 14, during a traditional music concert, a new song, “Ei ole üksi üksi maa” (No Land is Alone), composed by Alo Mattiissen, was sung by various popular singers. It turned the event into part of the ongoing Phosphorus War campaign. Mattiissen’s song was banned.¹⁵² The media published anti-mining articles despite regime censorship. After nine months, the Estonia Communist Party gave up on the mining plan.¹⁵³ But by then, Estonians had learned the value of protest and had lost some of their fear of the KGB.

On August 23, 1987, the “Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Estonian abbreviation MRP-AEG)” organized a mass demonstration in Tallinn, demanding that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, including its secret annexation protocols, should be revealed.”¹⁵⁴ A week later, the Estonian Communist Party banned all mass demonstrations. Government propaganda declared that the masterminds behind the anti-Soviet event were the radio stations “Voice of America,” “Radio Free Europe,” and “Freedom” and a small cell of former enemies of the state, led by Tiit Madisson.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Rein Ruutsoo, “Tagasivaateid Vabaduse Teele”- Eestimaa Rahvarinde Roll Eesti Ajaloos 1988–1993,”[Looking Back on the Path of the Freedom – The Role of the Estonian Popular Front in Estonian History 1988–1993], in *Rahva Rinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem*,[*The Popular Front 1988–Twenty Years Later*], translated by Margus Kuul (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutüükikoda, 2008), 253–254.

¹⁵¹ According to Rein Ruutsoo, the Soviet Union had constant presence of armed forces up to 10,000–110,000 soldiers over the entire country in 300–350 different locations; *Ibid.*, 238.

¹⁵² Mart Laar, Urmas Ott, and Sirje Endre, “Fosforiidisõda 1987,” [The Phosphorus War 1987] in *Teine Eesti: Eesti Iseseisvuse Taassünd 1986–1991*, [Another Estonia–The Rebirth of Independent Estonia 1986–1991] translated by Margus Kuul, eds. Elle Veermäe, Leila Lehtmets, Kristiina Märtin (Tallinn: SE&JS, 1996), 161.

¹⁵³ *Estonica, Encyclopedia About Estonia*, “Phosphorite War,” http://www.estonica.org/en/Phosphorite_War/.

¹⁵⁴ *Estonica, Encyclopedia About Estonia*, “Estonian National Independence Party,” http://www.estonica.org/en/Estonian_National_Independence_Party/.

¹⁵⁵ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 173.

On January 28, communist leaders in the Supreme Soviet of Estonia changed regulations in order to maintain control over civil disobedience and potential demonstrations. Now, unless approved, civil demonstrations were banned.¹⁵⁶ Some weeks later, during the Estonian Communist Party (ECP) main meeting, the announcement was made that the ongoing civil unarmed insurrections were initiated by the United States of America.¹⁵⁷

On December 24, an anti-U.S. demonstration took place in the capital city of Tallinn, organized by the Estonian Communist Party. The demonstrators were mainly Russian workers and various Estonian communists. The demonstration was backed by the media. Just days before, the ECP had established “anti-propaganda groups.” On the same day, the Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact also held successful demonstrations.¹⁵⁸

According to Laberpetz, the April 1988 meeting of the Conference of Artists’ and Scientists’ Union was the beginning of a new era.¹⁵⁹ Estonian intelligentsia gathered in the Supreme Soviet of Estonia in Toompea and launched a massive critique against the ruling regime.¹⁶⁰ This event was a catastrophe for local communist leaders and marked the weakening of the regime.

On April 13, during the TV show “Mõtleme Veel” (“Let’s Think Again”), emerging leader Edgar Savisaar made a proposition to create a civil movement. Savisaar named it the Popular Front. The idea behind it was simple. The Popular Front would support Gorbachev’s policies.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 220.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 231.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 234–236.

¹⁵⁹ Mikko Lagerspetz, “Social Problems in Estonian Mass Media 1975–1991,” *Acta Sociologica* 36, no. 4 (1993): 359, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4200871>.

¹⁶⁰ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 277–290.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 291–293.

In 1988, the Estonians began mass political mobilization, but oddly, the youth remained mostly bystanders. For them, the Popular Front was not popular at all because of its official cooperation with the communists.¹⁶² Everything changed, however, in the summer of 1988. When the youth gathered on June 4 for traditional Old Town Days in the capital of Tallinn, a student plenum was held, followed by a nonviolent raid.¹⁶³ Thousands of young people looking for action hoisted the Estonian flag and fought back the police efforts to confiscate it. Then they marched to the song festival fairground to sing. They agreed to return every evening until the end of Old Town Days.¹⁶⁴ Vesilind wrote that the crowd grew each night and soon there were 100,000 people singing patriotic songs. It was the beginning of the Singing Revolution.¹⁶⁵

Karl Vaino, the head of the Estonian Communist Party, was in a panic and requested that Moscow send extra troops to suppress the “uprising.” The request was not granted.¹⁶⁶ The Soviet Estonian Ministry of Interior had plenty of manpower and was able to mobilize 10,000 soldiers and triple the size of the security force on short notice.¹⁶⁷

On September 11, the Popular Front along with other movements organized “The Song of Estonia 88,” which was held in Tallinn at the Song Festival shell. This essentially was like a Popular Front “autumn offensive,”¹⁶⁸ which mobilized 250,000–300,000 people at the site.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶² Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 349.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 351.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 353.

¹⁶⁵ Priit Vesilind (with James and Maureen Tusty), “Summer of Songs,” *The Singing Revolution: How Culture Saved the Nation* (Tallinn: Varrak, 2009), 127.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 129.

¹⁶⁷ Enno Selirand, “Laul Karastas Rahva Tahet” [The Song Hardened the Will of the People] in Eestimaa Laul 88: *Kõned, Fotod, Meenutused, CD, [The Song of Estonia 88:Speeches, Photos and Reminiscences, CD]* ed. Elme Väljaste and Eerik Kändler (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutüükikoja OÜ, 2011), 82.

¹⁶⁸ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne 1988*, 272.

¹⁶⁹ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 418.

The Popular Front was established officially in October during the first Popular Front Founding Congress.¹⁷⁰ It was the first time the Popular Front had shown its real capability and outreach to the public and the Communist Party. Donations made by organizations and companies totaled 80,904 rubles, while donations from the public amounted to 162,271 rubles.¹⁷¹

On November 16, 1988, the legislative body of Estonia issued the Sovereignty Declaration.¹⁷² This event marked the start of the collapse of Soviet Union.¹⁷³ The Popular Front, The Green Movement and The Heritage Society united and collected almost 900,000 signatures that were addressed to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia and the Supreme Soviet Union to show opposition to Moscow's attempt to change the Soviet constitution in a way that would make it more difficult for Soviet republics, such as Estonia, to change their own laws.¹⁷⁴

The year 1989 was full of political events, including elections. A couple of months before the elections, on January 18, the Supreme Soviet of Estonia declared Estonian the official language. On February 24, the Estonian flag was hoisted on the tower of Long Hermann, the parliament.¹⁷⁵

Russians living in Estonia were upset by the changes. In the first week of March, the "First Congress of Inter Front" was held. The main speaker, Jyri Rudjak, aggressively opposed sovereignty for Estonia. Soon after, nonviolent demonstrations were held in different cities in Estonia, including Tallinn, where 30,000 Russians demanded annulment of the Language Act or the Inter Front would propose the separation of Northeast Estonia.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 274.

¹⁷¹ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 425.

¹⁷² Peter Hayes, "Chronology 1988," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 1, *America and the World* 1988/89 (1988/1989): 230, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043893>.

¹⁷³ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 275.

¹⁷⁴ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 443–445.

¹⁷⁵ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 277.

¹⁷⁶ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 515–518.

On March 26, the Popular Front won the Supreme Soviet of Estonia elections. The Popular Front achieved a strategic political victory over the Inter Front on March 26, 1989, winning 27 seats out of 37 during elections for the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union. The Estonian communists and The Popular Front worked together against Inter Front.¹⁷⁷

A peaceful mass demonstration, known as a Baltic Chain, occurred on August 23, 1989, in Estonia and other Baltic States with 2 million participants.¹⁷⁸ In the autumn of 1989, people started to voluntarily withdraw from the Estonian Communist Party.¹⁷⁹ On September 15, 1989, the Inter Front copied the Baltic Chain activity. On November 16, it organized a meeting with 30,000 demonstrators and demanded autonomy for Northeast Estonia.¹⁸⁰

In 1990, numerous political events paved the road to Estonian independence. The Popular Front and Sävisaar, despite opposition from the other parties, managed to achieve full political power. Anatol Lieven notes that “almost 70 percent of the deputies elected to the Estonian Supreme Council in March 1990 belonged to the Popular Front...”¹⁸¹

Democratic elections to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia were held on March 18. The Popular Front won 44 seats out of 105.¹⁸² Now, the official majority was making rapid changes. On May 8, the supreme council officially declared the formation of the Estonia Republic and rejected all official symbols of the former Soviet Estonia.¹⁸³ The head of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, declared the Soviet Estonia decision invalid. The

¹⁷⁷ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 278–279.

¹⁷⁸ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 580–581.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 614.

¹⁸⁰ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 285–287.

¹⁸¹ Anatol Lieven, “The Independence Movement and their Successors, 1987–1992,” in *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 277.

¹⁸² Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 292–293.

¹⁸³ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 686.

next day the Inter Front, inspired by the Gorbachev decision, stormed the Supreme Council.¹⁸⁴

Immediately, Estonians gathered in Toompea and with nonviolent action forced the Inter Front demonstrators out. Marju Lauristin states, “For me, this was a real symbol of Estonian-style politics: keeping it calm but getting your objectives, your aims, fulfilled. It was a major victory that we didn’t have any blood. Not a drop.”¹⁸⁵

Finally, after years of multifaceted nonviolent struggle in the Soviet Union, the communist system began to feel the paralyzing effect of unarmed insurrection.

On August 20, 1991, the Estonian Supreme Council officially restored the Republic of Estonia. The next day, Soviet troops were sent to Estonia to maintain control because of an attempted coup d'état in Moscow. The Soviet military stormed the Tallinn TV tower on August 21, but they could not interrupt radio broadcasts because Estonians had organized a human shield and blocked the doors. On August 24, Boris Yeltsin, the new leader of the Russian Republic, officially recognized the Republic of Estonia.¹⁸⁶ The Soviet leaders had few options. Official recognition of the Republic of Estonia was the best option available because at the same time the Soviets had an ongoing coup d'état attempt in Moscow.

B. ANALYSIS

The success of the Singing Revolution can be attributed to several factors.

1. Leadership

The Singing Revolution’s leadership can be characterized as charismatic and decentralized. It had numerous popular leaders. Most of them were intellectuals, artists, journalists, academics, and musicians. The Popular Front’s top political leader, Edgar Savisaar, was a career communist. Another key leader, Marju Lauristin, was a professor at Tartu University. Both of them represented pro-communist political views.

¹⁸⁴ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 688.

¹⁸⁵ Vesilind, *The Singing Revolution*, 146–147.

¹⁸⁶ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 310–314.

Rein Ruutsoo states that the presence of homegrown communists among the Popular Front leadership allowed it to infiltrate the Communist Party's most critical powerbase.¹⁸⁷ The leaders' ability to cooperate with different movements allowed the Popular Front to deeply penetrate Estonian society and take over already established networks and influence other opposition civil organizations and cells.¹⁸⁸ By 1988, the Popular Front support cells had been created inside many government institutions. For example, the first support cell was established in the transportation association, Tallinna Autoveod, where it took advantage of pre-established official networks to support Popular Front activities. Quickly, over 300 similar support cells were created in numerous official institutions all over Estonia with 13,000 members.¹⁸⁹

Heritage Society leaders Trivimi Velliste and Mart Laar represented moderate views while Estonian Independence Party (ENIP) leaders Tunne Kelam, Heiki Ahonen and Tiit Madison represented radical political views. Velliste supported ““The Hungarian path”” as the immediate objective, a ““socialist’ Estonia outside the Soviet Union.”¹⁹⁰ ENIP leaders directly challenged and demanded the end of the Soviet occupation.¹⁹¹

The Heritage Society, and especially the Estonian Independence Party leadership, comprised direct political opposition to the ECP. It is noteworthy that despite different political views and goals, the Popular Front, the Heritage Society and ENIP leadership emphasized strategic civil resistance.

¹⁸⁷ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 36.

¹⁸⁸ Edgar Savisaar’s speech clearly recognizes this assumption. Savisaar stated during the First Popular Front Congress that 28 percent of Popular Front attorneys belong to Estonian Communist Party, 19 percent are members of the Heritage Society, 10 percent are involved with Green Movement, 2 percent are involved with religion unions and 0.2 percent with ERSP [Estonian National Independence Party] and MRP-AEG [Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact]. Ninety-one percent of Popular Front activists are Estonians, over 6 percent are Russians and over 2 percent are other people from various nations. The Popular Front was made up of urban laborers, 25 percent; rural laborers, 5.6 percent; production workers, 18.4 percent; and others, 35.8 percent. Edgar Savisaar, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 26–27.

¹⁸⁹ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 343.

¹⁹⁰ Rein Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” *Soviet Studies* 42, no.2 (April 1990): 334, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152084>.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 335.

Musicians like Alo Mattiissen and other celebrities represented Estonian cultural leadership and helped to mobilize and transmit the political leaders' messages in public. Song festivals and concerts initiated by celebrities during the Singing Revolution played an important part of political mobilization and the marketing of prohibited national colors and symbols.

2. High Participation Level

Participation in the Singing Revolution was very high. Hundreds of thousands of people were involved in mass demonstrations. High commitment is partly explained through pre-established social networks, which managed to initiate visible political action. According to Johnston and Snow, the Estonian nationalist oppositional subculture “formed the basis for mass mobilization of the independence movement in the late 1980s.”¹⁹² As an example, they cited “...local theater troupes, scholar societies, local history associations, bee-keeping, and horticultural societies in rural areas, and small intellectual groups like the English Academic Association and Book Lovers.”¹⁹³ Intellectuals had access to political mobilization resources through official social networks.

The Phosphorus War in the spring of 1987 was initiated by Estonian intellectuals who worked in government agencies. For example, an official resentment letter against future mining was written by The Estonian Lawyers Association and Teachers Association. The Academy of Sciences of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic released a public anti-mining appeal. The Board of Tartu University approved the decision to oppose future phosphorus mining on April 24, 1987. As a result, the May 1 parade, organized for traditional Soviet Union glorification in Tartu, was a total failure. Students grabbed the initiative and launched an anti-mining protest instead.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Hank Johnston and David A. Snow, “Subcultures and the Emerge of the Estonian Nationalist Opposition 1945–1990,” *Sociological Perspective* 41, no.3 (1998): 479, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3435987>.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 483–484.

¹⁹⁴ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 159–161.

Participation grew on June 14, 1988, the Day of Deportation,¹⁹⁵ when demonstrations occurred all over Estonia, as well as in neighboring Baltic States.¹⁹⁶

The idea of creating the Popular Front also triggered people to start mobilizing. The Popular Front grew rapidly. By early June 1988, it had 883 support cells and approximately 50,000 members. Popular Front leaders came up with the idea of a mass demonstration and were inspired by the events of the song festival grounds.¹⁹⁷ By the end of July 1988, more than 1,100 cells had been established.¹⁹⁸

Peter Hayes notes that by June 20, the Soviet Republic of Estonia had officially recognized the Peoples Front, a 40,000-member nationalist organization. Hayes wrote, “The recognition is the first for a large noncommunist political group in the Soviet Union.”¹⁹⁹

A peaceful demonstration, known as a Baltic Chain, occurred on August 23, 1989. The event, which embraced the Baltic States, was initiated by Savisaar. It was held on the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Approximately 300,000–400,000 Estonians joined hands in a human chain that included over two million people all throughout the Baltic States. People were inspired by the song “The Baltics Are Waking Up! Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia....”²⁰⁰

While Estonian nationalism was rising, the reach of the Soviet political power was falling. The KGB vanguard lost control over the Estonian people. Under *Glasnost*, Moscow made some critical contributions to the campaign’s success. Without fear of repression and coercion, Estonians started national-level political mass mobilization.

¹⁹⁵ *Estonica, Encyclopedia About Estonia*, “The June deportation is the term denoting the forceful deportation of about 10,000 people from Estonia to Russia on 14 June, 1941 by the Soviet regime,” http://www.estonica.org/en/The_June_deportation,_1941/.

¹⁹⁶ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 356.

¹⁹⁷ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 393.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 343.

¹⁹⁹ Peter Hayes, “Chronology 1988,” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 1, *America and the World 1988/89* (1988/1989): 230, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043893>.

²⁰⁰ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 580–581.

This, in turn, raised the level of civil resistance participation and demonstrated the people's desire for change.

3. Regime Loyalty Shift

Chenoweth claims that the Singing Revolution in 1989 showed no loyalty shift.²⁰¹ One did take place, however, starting in 1988 and continuing through 1991.

The Popular Front was officially supported by the ECP after party leader Karl Vaino was deposed in 1988. The new ECP leader, Vaino Väljas, officially supported the goals, which were written in the manifest of the Popular Front.²⁰² For instance, on February 23, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of Estonia revoked the portion of the Soviet Estonian constitution reaffirming the Communist Party's leading role. Soon after, 75,000 people out of 110,000 left the party.²⁰³ The ECP disintegrated.

It is noteworthy, however, that Moscow authorized peaceful transference of security responsibility on March 1, 1991. Soviet Minister of Interior Vadim Bakunin signed the agreement and the Estonian Miilits (Police) was given control under the Estonian government.²⁰⁴ One of the important pillars of political power had been peacefully shifted to Estonians.

The Singing Revolution also offers good examples of third-party support. In 1991, Moscow was paralyzed by local Russian civil movements. The regime witnessed internal loyalty shifts. Three hundred enterprises in Leningrad declared support and launched strikes supporting the Baltic countries.²⁰⁵

²⁰¹Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works,’” 74, <http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf>.

²⁰² Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne 1988*, 274–275.

²⁰³ Ibid., 290.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 304.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 302.

Four days later, approximately 300,000 Russians launched a peaceful demonstration in the heart of the empire, in Moscow at the Kremlin, in support of the Baltics.²⁰⁶ Gorbachev promised Arnold Rüütel, the head of Soviet Estonia, that he would not use military force in Estonia.²⁰⁷ Despite the promises, the military was involved in a failed attempt to control Estonia. The conflict ended without casualties.

4. Strategy

The Estonian Singing Revolution leadership successfully utilized a predominantly nonviolent resistance strategy. To politically mobilize the people, the leadership of The Popular Front, the Heritage Society and ENIP focused on themes such as Gorbachev's perestroika, protection of the Estonian culture and language, and Soviet crimes against humanity in Estonia.

Philip Roeder points out those political entrepreneurs could use two strategies: the "primordial and instrumental"²⁰⁸ or a mixture of the two strategies.²⁰⁹ The Estonians had used a hybrid nonviolent strategy for mobilizing people during the Phosphorus War by combining ethnic and environmental issues and goals under one banner.

The most effective civil resistance strategy was formulated by the Popular Front, which led to the takeover of political power in Estonia in 1990. The strategy was guided by the Soviet Estonian Constitution and its goals were disclosed publicly in the manifesto published in the newspaper *Edasi*. The core of the strategy was to establish support cells in existing work places, clubs, religious congregations, schools and other places. The

²⁰⁶ Patricia Lee Droff, "Chronology 1991," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 1 *America and the World 1991/92* (1991/1992): 196, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045117>.

²⁰⁷ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 303.

²⁰⁸ Roeder notes in his study: "The primordial strategy focuses on ethnic revival—in Smith's words, 'communal regeneration through self-discovery and self-realization.' The mobilization of the ethnic community for political action often centers on an assertion of the ethnic group's identity, usually in the context of issues of culture, identity, or belief and in reaction to threats to the identity from assimilative policies. The instrumental strategy focuses on the pursuit of social and economic interests." Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 203, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010471>.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 203.

Popular Front Harta declared using persuasion and, if needed, civil resistance to achieve goals.²¹⁰

Part of the Popular Front strategy was to take the leading role in the communist Estonian Supreme Council, the only official body in Estonia recognized by the Soviets. The goal was to democratize the Supreme Council and negotiate with Moscow.²¹¹ The ultimate goal was economic and political sovereignty. The Popular Front took the leading role in the Self-Managing economic program (the Estonian abbreviation is IME, which means ‘miracle’) which was worked out in September 1987 by a group of Estonian economists. The program showed that the Estonian economy could survive independently. One of the perestroika-era arguments for keeping the Soviet Union whole was the claim that the republics within the union could not manage on their own. IME emphasized the opposite.²¹²

The Popular Front strategy was supported by the ECP and rapidly grew its membership, which allowed it to maintain a mainstream position until the end of the Singing Revolution. In addition, part of the Popular Front’s strategy included cooperation with Russians living in Estonia. The message was that the movement represents all people regardless of nationality.²¹³

Conversely, The Heritage Society and ENIP strategy did not include cooperation with the ECP. Their strategy was to establish an alternative legislative body. On December 24, 1989, the ENIP and the Heritage Society decided to run their own political campaigns to form an Estonian congress. According to Tunne Kelam, the mastermind

²¹⁰ Rein Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne website*. “Eestimaa Rahvarinde Põhidokument (Rahvarinde Harta),” [The Charter of the Popular Front], http://www.rahvarinne.ee/public_uploads/files/101/1._september_1988_-_Rahvarinde_pohidokument,_Rahvarinde_harta.jpg.

²¹¹ Kadri Simson, “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele” – Eesti Rahvarinde Roll Ajaloos 1988–1993,” [Comments to Speeches during the Second Congress – The Role of the Popular Front in Estonian History 1988–1993] in *Rahvarinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem*, [The Popular Front 1988–Twenty Years Later], translated by Margus Kuul, ed. by Aire Veskimäe (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutüükikoda, 2008), 61.

²¹² *Estonica, Encyclopedia about Estonia*, “Self Managing Estonia,” http://www.estonica.org/en/Self-Managing_Estonia/.

²¹³ Simson, “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele,” 64.

behind the Estonian congress, the idea “presents a genuine alternative to the illegal Soviet structure.”²¹⁴ Part of their strategy was the creation of Citizens’ Committee Movements.

In February 1989, The Heritage Foundation and ENIP started a unique mass initiative known as “Citizens’ Committee Movements.” In one year, local citizens’ committees had signed up 860,000 Estonians—including refugees and their dependents around the world—who had declared that they were citizens of the original Estonia, not part of the Soviet Union.²¹⁵

On October 29, the Citizens’ Committee Movements had 314,521 members in 111 cells. Additional cells were established in Paris, Stockholm and Moscow.²¹⁶

On January 26, 1990, the Estonian intelligentsia published a collective statement in which they recognized the Estonian Congress and declared the Supreme Soviet of Estonia as void.²¹⁷ This statement forced the Popular Front to cooperate with the Estonian Congress. On February 24, elections were held for the Estonian Congress, and in March 1990, Congress established a legislative body without any official power.²¹⁸ Moscow refused to negotiate with the Estonian Congress.²¹⁹ Their strategy was not successful.

Meanwhile the Popular Front was carrying out its strategy through a variety of methods of nonviolent resistance, which included collective singing. Gene Sharp notes that “under some conditions, singing may constitute a method of nonviolent protest...”²²⁰ The Popular Front organized activities to include collective patriotic singing in public places, civil appeals, mass demonstrations and gatherings, public declarations, agreements, negotiations, high level use of mass media, marketing, using symbols such as

²¹⁴ Vesilind, *The Singing Revolution*, 144.

²¹⁵ Vesilind, *The Singing Revolution*, 139–143.

²¹⁶ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 630.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 643.

²¹⁸ Vesilind, *The Singing Revolution*, 144–145.

²¹⁹ Simson, “Kommentaarid II Kongressi Kõnedele,” 63.

²²⁰ Gene Sharp, “The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion,” in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action: the Methods of Nonviolent Action*. Part Two. ed. Marina Finkelstein (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1998), 149.

flags, posters, and leaflets. These demonstrated the civil resistance leadership's understanding of nonviolent conflict doctrine and strategic-level planning.

5. Organization

The Singing Revolution case study shows the importance of strong and well-organized grassroots-level civil resistance. The Popular Front, The Heritage Society and The Estonian Independence Party, the three main players in the Singing Revolution, made use of established social networks and umbrella organizations. During the summer of 1987, civil social movements mushroomed and established networks. The communist regime had created favorable conditions for these organizations because of perestroika and glasnost. When the political opportunity was available, established networks, clubs and social networks immediately transformed themselves into more formal organizations.

The Heritage Society

The Heritage Society was formed from the book club "Tõru."²²¹ In 1987, the Heritage movement grew quickly until it consisted of over a "thousand members in 31 different clubs."²²² A couple of months later, in early autumn, The Heritage Society included 62 clubs and 2,259 members.²²³ Taagepera notes that at the beginning of 1989 the movement had 10,000 members, "including Russian, Jewish and Armenian chapters."²²⁴ The Estonian Heritage Society was officially established on December 12, 1987.²²⁵ The organization was culture-oriented and represented national political views.

²²¹ According to Trivimi Velliste: book club "Tõru" was established on December 30, 1974. The main hidden goal of the social club was researching Estonian history. In ten years, club members made more than "two hundred" presentations at the meetings. The Club's real activity kept a low profile and club members were secretly chosen. In 1986, at gatherings in Jüri Church and 1987 in Tallinn and Keila, The Heritage Society revealed its goals to protect the history, monuments and culture of Estonians. Members of The Heritage Society started to clean up and renovate neglected monuments, church gardens with help of local peoples. Trivimi Velliste, "Vastused Mart Laari küsimustele faksi teel New Yorkist 29. Mail 1996." [Trivimi Velliste Answers to Mart Laar Questions via telefax from New York on 29 May 1996.] in Teine Eesti: Eesti Iseseisvuse Taassünd 1986–1991. [Another Estonia: The Rebirth of Independent Estonia, 1986–1991"], ed. by Elle Veermäe, Leila lehtmets, Kristiina Märtin. (Tallinn: SE&JS, 1996), 312–335.

²²² Ibid., 194.

²²³ Ibid., 197.

²²⁴ Rein Taagepera, "A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia," *Soviet Studies* 42, no.2 (April 1990): 334, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/152084>.

²²⁵ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 259.

The Popular Front

The Popular Front, after its establishment in 1989, used local social networks and took advantage of its position within the Communist Party. For example, on May 23, 1988, the environmental organization “Roheliste Liikumine” (Green Movement) was established.²²⁶ Later, the Greens Movement linked up with the Popular Front creating more local chapters and improved social networks. In 1989, organization had around 6,000 members.²²⁷ The Popular Front took advantage of pre-established Green Movement social networks.

According to Johnston and Aarelait-Tart, moderate autonomists formed the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) in 1988. “The front mobilized rapidly by using Soviet infrastructure and resources, such as trade union organizations. It was broad-based, reformist, and widely supported by the intellectuals—a significant element in the PFE’s success.”²²⁸ For example, the Popular Front established a working group within the production association known as Estoplast. In 1988, 1,000 Estoplast members took part in “The Song of Estonia 88” event.²²⁹ In 1988, the Popular Front Congress was held in the concert venue in Tallinn, hosting thousands of people.²³⁰

The Popular Front gained strong support at the grassroots level. For example, regional farming collective construction offices, schools, and cooperatives all supported the Popular Front activities and organized support cells. Taagepera notes that the Popular Front had “the total informal membership of about 100,000 rivals to the CPE

²²⁶ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 343.

²²⁷ Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” 334.

²²⁸ Hank Johnston and Aili Aarelaid-Tart, “Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobilization: The Estonians National Movement, 1940–1991,” *Sociological Perspectives* 43.no.4 (Winter 2000):689–690, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1389553>.

²²⁹ Ülo Nugis, “Usutlus Ülo Nugisega,” [Ülo Nugis Interview] in *Eestimaa Laul 88, [Song Of Estonia 88]* ed. Elme Väljaste and Enno Selirand (Tallinn: MTÜ Eestimaa Laul, 2011), 219.

²³⁰ Edgar Savisaar, “Rahvarinde I Kongress 1. Oktoober 1988.a” – Eesti Rahvarinde Roll Ajaloos 1988–1993,” [The Congress of the Popular Front on October 1, 1988 – The Role of the Popular Front in Estonian History 1988–1993] in *Rahvarinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem [The Popular Front 1988–Twenty Years Later]*, (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutüükikoda, 2008), 22–31.

[Communist Party of Estonia] (110,000), with an overlapping membership of about 25,000.”²³¹

The Estonian National Independence Party

The Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP) was established “on the basis of a pre-existing organization and had in early 1989 about 300-card-carrying members.”²³² ENIP emerged from The Estonian Group on Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and represented the radical side of the opposition movement. Johnston and Aarelait-Tart state that radical restorationists, dissidents and non-communists from the Stalin era carried “the pure Estonian collective action frame.”²³³ The ENIP, unlike the Popular Front, did not cooperate with communists and therefore was not able to access the same political mobilization resources as the Popular Front.

It must be noted that the Popular Front, ENIP and The Heritage Society were able to cooperate despite very different political views. A conflict emerged, however, on February 24, 1989, when the Estonian flag was hoisted on the tower of Long Hermann, the parliament.²³⁴ The flag-hoisting event was initiated and organized by The Heritage Society. The Popular Front strongly opposed the event. This led to clear friction.²³⁵ The Popular Front’s primary goal was not to establish Estonian independence. The goal was political and economic sovereignty as a Soviet state and not as an independent country, which was contrary to the wishes of the ENIP (Estonian National Independence Party).

6. Narrative

The master narrative during the Singing Revolution involved national victimization and targeted vilification based on historical animosities. The narrative included stories about endangerment of the Estonian language and culture. Estonians

²³¹ Taagepera, “A Note on the March 1989 Elections in Estonia,” 333.

²³² Ibid., 335.

²³³ Johnston and Aarelaid-Tart, “Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobilization: The Estonian National Movement, 1940–1991,” 690.

²³⁴ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne* 1988, 277.

²³⁵ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 558.

were victims of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany's Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols, which resulted in the Soviet occupation in 1940. Another theme was the coercive Russification and vilification of patriotic Estonians and dissidents, such as Lagle Parek, Tiit Madiisson and many others.

By the mid-1980s, Estonia had been occupied by the Soviets for 40 years. People at every social level, especially the intelligentsia, used to walk "fist in their pocket"²³⁶ as a sign of passive resistance. The Estonians' collective memory was full of grievances. Three generations of Estonians remembered Soviet occupation and coercive mass deportation in 1941 as well as armed resistance conducted by the Forest Brothers. The master narrative included the desire for social change and independence, which mobilized the people; therefore, the movements did not have recruitment problems. In addition, Estonians experienced daily coercive Russification and had witnessed imprisonment of political dissidents. Estonians felt that the nation and the Estonian identity were at risk because of Russian-speaking laborers' mass immigration.

7. Doctrine

The Singing Revolution had remarkable nonviolent discipline. Not a single mass gathering turned to violence over four years. In 1991, Defense Minister Raivo Vare ordered the legislature to rely only on civil resistance when dealing with revolutionary Russians in case of occupation.²³⁷ Vare notes, "The resistance that we planned in 1991 and organized through communications with other Estonian towns and cities was to a remarkable extent based on your [Gene Sharp] book, *Civilian-Based Defense*."²³⁸ People were prepared for civil resistance. Gene Sharp notes, "In well-prepared campaigns, clear

²³⁶ Raimond Kaljulaid, "Eessõna: Rusikas Taskus" [The Fist in the Pocket] in *Rahvarinne 1988: Kakskümmend Aastat Hiljem [The Popular Front 1988–Twenty Years Later]*, (Tallinn: Tallinna Raamatutüükikoda, 2008), 13.

²³⁷ Bruce Jenkins, "Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics," in *Nonviolent Sanctions: News from The Albert Einstein Institution*, III, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92): 5, 8.

²³⁸ The Albert Einstein Institution, in *Report of Activities 2000–2004* (Boston: Pride Printers), 13.

instructions will be issued to the general population and to particular groups that are asked to carry out specific acts of resistance and defiance in disciplined ways.”²³⁹

In 1991, the newspaper “Rahva Hääl” produced “Ten Points of Civil Disobedience,”²⁴⁰ and provided guidance on how to act in case of occupation.²⁴¹ According to Bruce Jenkins, Estonians planned for nonviolent struggle at the strategic level.²⁴² This strategic activity during the Singing Revolution was a direct outcome of Sharp’s lectures in 1989 in Moscow.²⁴³

8. Other Factors

Certain other factors are worthy of consideration for their effects on the Singing Revolution.

Political Opportunity

Perestroika and glasnost provided an opportunity for social mobilization and open questioning of the legitimacy of the existing power base. Unknowingly, the Soviets made a strategic mistake and released the people’s power. It allowed the creation of a totally new nonviolent frontline that the Soviet Union did not know how to fight.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ Gene Sharp, “Conducting the Struggle,” *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc. 2005), 493.

²⁴⁰ According to Ruutsoo, “Ten Points of Civil Disobedience” included the following guidance to the population: Do not obey military orders that contradict Estonian Republic laws; do not reveal information that could initiate hostile activity against Estonia; do not respond to provocations; make notes and keep the Soviet hostilities chronology in order to inform international community; maintain citizen movements and establish alternative structures; be ready to conduct mass actions and strikes. Rein Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne 1988*, 301.

²⁴¹ Ibid., 301.

²⁴² Jenkins, “Civilian-Based Defense Discussed in Moscow and Baltics,” 5.

²⁴³ Bruce Jenkins, “Center of Ethics of Nonviolence Formed in Moscow,” in *Nonviolent Sanctions: News From The Albert Einstein Institution* I, no. 3 (Winter 1989/90): 2, http://www.aeinsteinst.org/organizations/org/03_winter89_90-1.pdf.

²⁴⁴ According to Bruce Jenkins: “The director of the Ethics Section of the Institute of Philosophy, Dr. Abdusalam Guseinov, stated that the conference organizers had hoped to gain a broad survey of the ‘field’ through the differing perspectives. He explained that Soviet scholars were new to this area (‘the Russian tongue must learn to speak this word nonviolence again’); hence, they wanted to see what was ‘out there.’” Ibid., 1–2.

Mass Media

Internal mobilization resources like mass media, government infrastructure and publishing houses were extensively used by the movement. After 1987, censorship was gradually eliminated in the Baltics.²⁴⁵ For example, the newspaper *Noorte Hääl* periodically released anti-mining articles, while the journal *Kultuur ja Elu* published a special edition on the dangers of phosphorus mining.²⁴⁶ Estonian Radio was the mouthpiece for moderate autonomists to spread their message.²⁴⁷

In 1988, the journals *Looming* and *Kultuur ja Elu* continuously released *glasnost* (transparency) articles.²⁴⁸ In 1989, the civil resistance had access to publishing houses in Tartu. The publishing houses also had print runs for popular Russian movements in defiance of the regime.²⁴⁹ The local regime, despite professed free speech, continued to try to censor the media for vilification of the Soviets.

C. SUMMARY

Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan classify the Singing Revolution as having achieved full success.²⁵⁰ The civil resistance campaign's secret weapons were the Estonian culture and singing. Civil resistance made effective use of conditions created by the Soviet Union. The resistance was aided by pre-established social networks, a strong narrative and a strategy of civil resistance.

As a result of perestroika and *glasnost*, President Gorbachev made political mobilization resources such as mass media, infrastructure and Communist Party resources available to the movement. Another of the Soviet Union's strategic mistakes

²⁴⁵ Lagerspetz, "Social Problems in Estonian Mass Media 1975–1991," 359.

²⁴⁶ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 165.

²⁴⁷ Johnston and Aarelaid-Tart, "Generations, Microcohorts, and Long-Term Mobilization: The Estonians National Movement, 1940–1991," 689.

²⁴⁸ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 240.

²⁴⁹ Nils R. Muiznieks "The Influence of the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process of Soviet Disintegration." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, no. 1(1995): 6, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/153191>.

²⁵⁰ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, "Appendix, Table A.1 Nonviolent Campaigns," in *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, ed. Bruce Hoffman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 233.

was to diminish KGB control over the population, which allowed oppositional subcultures to shift from covert opposition to open civil resistance.

The case study shows clear evidence that pre-established decentralized social and official organizations and groups such as youths, students, poets, musicians, artists, writers, scientists and others played a crucial role in the Singing Revolution. The use of civil resistance, discipline and clear goals indicates the presence of strategic planning. The four years of civil resistance was nonviolent, which indicates leaders and followers understood the doctrine.

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V. THE DRUZE RESISTANCE IN ISRAEL, 1981–1982

A. INTRODUCTION

As one outcome of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the Golan Heights. Tayseer Mara'i and Usama R. Halabi describe the region as most of the Qunaytra province and parts of southwest Syria, a mountainous plateau coveted for its strategic position and water resources.²⁵¹

The outcome of the conflict was devastating for the Golan Heights' inhabitants. Bashar Tarabieh explains, "During the 1967 war, 95 percent of the population of the Golan Heights, 130,000 people in 129 villages, fled or was expelled by invading Israeli forces."²⁵² The Druze population of the Golan Heights, protected by the mountainous terrain, were mostly untouched by the armed conflict. Mara'i and Halabi note that six Druze villages survived the war.²⁵³ According to R. Scott Kennedy, the whole population of the Druze in the Golan Heights was 13,000.²⁵⁴

Israeli actions after the conflict were a clear sign of permanent occupation. Israeli military forces were put in charge, old Syrian currency was changed to Israeli currency and new vehicle license plates and identification cards were issued.²⁵⁵ "The Israelis also banned at the beginning of their occupation the Syrian curriculum and replaced it with one specially designed to inculcate a sense of separate 'Druze identity' distinct from the Arab identity—as if members of this eleventh-century offshoot of Islam constituted a nation rather than a religious sect."²⁵⁶ In other words, after the occupation, the Israeli government started to radically change Druze society at the grassroots level. This marked

²⁵¹ Tayseer Mara'i and Usama R. Halabi, "Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 78, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537689>.

²⁵² Bashar Tarabieh, "Education, Control and Resistance in the Golan Heights," *Middle East Report*, no. 194/195, *Odds against Peace* (May–August 1995): 44, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012791>.

²⁵³ Mara'i and Halabi, "Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights," 79.

²⁵⁴ R. Scott Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 50, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536896>.

²⁵⁵ Mara'i and Halabi, "Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights," 80.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

the beginning of the decades-long Arab Druze resistance to annexation and refusal to cooperate.

1. Significance of the Case

The 1982 general strike by the Druze was a remarkable example of civil resistance.²⁵⁷ The Druze resistance, unlike the Cedar Revolution and the Singing Revolution, was effective despite the much smaller numbers of participants. The Druze resistance succeeded through the wise use of civil resistance strategy and exploitation of the enemies' weaknesses. The religious nature of the conflict also created an especially strong narrative. The Druze noncooperation campaign was significantly nonviolent during the whole campaign. Mubarak E. Awad said the campaign was "...well organized, and intelligent in its methods, ideas, and the execution of classic non-violence tactics."²⁵⁸

2. Synopsis

In 1981, Israel made a decisive step to gain control over the Golan Heights. On June 3, 1981, Druze residents held a strike to protest the arrest of five local leaders suspected of inciting violence against Israel.²⁵⁹ On November 5, Israeli roadblocks prevented Druze high school students from reaching their school in the Golan Heights village of Masada. The students had refused to take part in classes promoting Israel and the Hebrew language.²⁶⁰

The Druze noncooperation campaign in December 1981 was triggered by an aggressive policy adopted by the Israeli government. Kennedy notes, "In a sharp departure from parliamentary practice, Begin's ruling Likud coalition forced through the Israeli Knesset the requisite three readings and final passage of legislation formally

²⁵⁷ Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance," 60.

²⁵⁸ Mubarak E. Awad, "Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 4 (Summer 1984): 22, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536988>.

²⁵⁹ "Chronology May 1, 1981–July 31, 1981," *Middle East Journal* 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 607, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326307>.

²⁶⁰ "Chronology November 1, 1981–January 15, 1982," *Middle East Journal* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 217, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326391>.

annexing the Golan to Israel, on December 14, 1981.”²⁶¹ On December 15, the ten European Common Market nations condemned the annexation.²⁶² On the same day, the Druze initiated a general strike.

Important developments started occurring on a daily basis, with Israel coming under increasing international pressure. On December 16, 1981, Syria asked the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Israel. The next day, the UN Security Council unanimously called on Israel to rescind the annexation. Despite the pressure, Israel rejected the UN Security Council’s demand.²⁶³

On January 1, 1982, the Israeli army imposed a curfew on Majdal Shams, a town in the Golan Heights.²⁶⁴ Days later, the U.S. National Security Council began considering action against Israel for imposing martial law on the occupied heights. The UN Security Council reopened its debate on the same issue.²⁶⁵

On February 13, 1982, the Israelis arrested four Druze leaders in the Golan Heights for allegedly inciting rebellion. About 3,000 Druze gathered in Majdal Shams and declared a general strike.²⁶⁶ Jewish employers responded by firing hundreds of Druze.²⁶⁷

On February 22, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the Israeli government had ended negotiations with the Druze.²⁶⁸ Within days, the Israelis had sealed off all Druze villages.²⁶⁹ Mara’i and Halabi describe Israel actions. “On 25 February, they [Israel] imposed a full blockade on the Golan. All transportation in and out of the area was

²⁶¹ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 53.

²⁶² “Chronology November 1, 1981–January 15, 1982,” 220.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 221.

²⁶⁶ “Chronology January 16, 1982–April 15, 1982,” *Middle East Journal* 36, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 390, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326428>.

²⁶⁷ “Chronology January 16, 1982–April 15, 1982,” 391.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

stopped; no food or medical supplies were allowed in; water and electricity were cut.”²⁷⁰ The Israelis had sent a clear message to the Druze; noncooperation would be punished with repression.

On March 11, 1982, Israeli authorities ordered the Druze to obtain Israeli identification papers by April 1. The strike by 13,000 Golan Druze stretched to 25 days.²⁷¹ On March 16, Israel imposed a new curfew on Majdal Shams for “repeated disruptions of public order by town residents.”²⁷²

Kennedy states that,

The Druze were led to believe that on April 1, 1982, the government effort to force citizenship upon them would end. Instead, the Israelis escalated from pressure to outright repression. An estimated 14–15,000 Israeli soldiers swarmed into the area. Seizing the village schools for military camps, they sealed off the Golan Heights from Israel and the other territories...Israel imposed a state of siege which was to last 43 days. Electricity and water to the villages were cut off. Several homes were destroyed. In one demonstration, nine people were wounded as it was broken up. At least two people died because ambulance service to nearby hospitals was denied Golani residents as part of the blockade. At least 150 people were arrested on each of several days...Most received fines for failing to have Israeli identification in their possession. During the siege, Israeli troops went door-to-door. They forced entry, confiscated the villagers’ identification papers from the period of Syrian rule or military occupation, and left them Israeli identification papers instead.²⁷³

On April 2, 1982, Israeli attempts to force ID cards on the Druze led to violent clashes, leading to injuries to six Israeli soldiers and four Druze. In the same week, however, Israel agreed to stop sealing Druze villages.²⁷⁴ Clashes and demonstrations continued throughout May.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁰ Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 83.

²⁷¹ “Chronology January 16, 1982–April 15, 1982,” 391.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 392.

²⁷³ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 55.

²⁷⁴ “Chronology January 16, 1982–April 15, 1982,” 393.

²⁷⁵ “Chronology April 16, 1982–July 15, 1982,” *Middle East Journal*, 36 no. 4 (Autumn 1982):564, <http://www.jstor/stable/4326470>.

In June 1982, after the Israelis invaded Lebanon, Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan and two Druze cabinet members resigned in protest.²⁷⁶ Mara'i and Halabi note, “By that time all eyes were focused on Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and brutal siege of Beirut; it was clear that in these new conditions it was pointless to try pressuring Israel over the Golan.”²⁷⁷

A year later, the Druze leadership ended their sanctions against adherents who had accepted Israeli identification cards.²⁷⁸ The next day, Israeli Defense Minister Arens called on the Lebanese Druze to accept the central government in preparation for Israel’s withdrawal from the region.²⁷⁹

B. ANALYSIS

Why did the Druze resistance succeed to the degree that it did? Several factors deserve consideration.

1. Leadership

The Druze resistance is a great example of civil resistance with decentralized leadership. While the Druze had sectarian leaders, the community had existing social structure designed to function even without religious and social leaders. Kennedy explains, “Leaders may have helped to discern the advisability of various actions, but they were primarily responding to what the community as a whole had arrived at through consensus. This allowed for continuity in the campaign and the building of momentum from one success to the next, even when leaders were placed under house arrest or in jail.”²⁸⁰ According to Gene Sharp, “It is natural for the opponent to believe that arresting the leadership will cause the movement to collapse.”²⁸¹ Kennedy elaborates, “On five

²⁷⁶ ‘Chronology April 16, 1982–July 15, 1982,’ 568.

²⁷⁷ Mara'i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights Source,” 84.

²⁷⁸ “Chronology July 16, 1983–October 15, 1983,” *Middle East Journal* 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 100, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326730>.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 60.

²⁸¹ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 636.

different occasions as many as 2,500 people gathered together to make decisions. The decision-making process for the villages was still largely intact because it was centered within their religious practices and hence more immune to overt Israeli interference.”²⁸² These community gatherings showed community cohesion and, Sharp said, can be defined as “Guerilla Theater.”²⁸³ The resistance leadership was decentralized. In addition to religious leaders, the resistance included a younger generation of secular leadership such as students, ex-prisoners and graduates who were taking part in the decision-making and implementation of civil resistance. Religious leaders provided cover for the activities of the young leaders.²⁸⁴

2. High Participation Level

A critical factor in the resistance campaign was the Druze’s high level of participation considering their relatively small population of 13,000. Participation was high because of community sectarian cohesion without internal barriers. This grassroots-level cohesiveness allowed the people to prepare, coordinate and launch continuous strategic-level village resistance.

The Druze could not militarily defeat Israel, but they were socially organized to be able to reduce their dependence on Israel to a minimum. The Druze center of gravity was the people’s resilience and their ability to conduct mass-based non-cooperation. Internal conditions for nonviolent struggle were good. Therefore, despite Israel’s coercive methods, the Druze nonviolent campaign lasted continuously for five months.²⁸⁵

The Druze set an example of how a nongovernmental actor could stand up to an overwhelmingly strong opponent. Mara’i and Halabi describe the Druze organizational efficiency. They state, “Demonstrations during the strike were held every few days,

²⁸² Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 60.

²⁸³ Gene Sharp states: “Guerilla theater, another method of social intervention, means a disruptive skit, dramatic presentation, or similar act. It came to be used in the United States in the late 1960s. The disruption may be of speeches, lecture, or normal proceeding of some groups or organization. (The term guerilla theater is also used for a spontaneous style of stage theater, usually with a political theme.) Gene Sharp, “The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention,” in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 397.

²⁸⁴ Tarabieh, “Education, Control and Resistance in the Golan Heights,” 45.

²⁸⁵ Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 83.

sometimes in all four villages at once, sometimes in a single village with residents of the others congregating there. Close coordination was maintained throughout via general meetings.”²⁸⁶

3. Regime Loyalty Shift

Chenoweth writes there was no loyalty shift.²⁸⁷ At the same time, however, during the Druze resistance there were recorded events of Israeli security forces’ defection and internal loyalty shift among Israel citizens. The Druze demonstrated an understanding of the strategic level of nonviolent struggle when they conducted nonviolent direct action against Israeli soldiers, who symbolized the girder of Israeli political power in the occupied Golan Heights. Kennedy explains how nonviolent direct action is linked to loyalty shift:

One unexpected source of support came from within those soldiers sent to enforce edicts against the villagers’ will. Villagers defied a strict curfew confining them to their homes to place tea and cookies outside their doors for the Israeli soldiers. They engaged them in conversation, and chose not to curse them. The early decision to talk with the Israeli soldiers resulted in villagers actively seeking soldiers out and speaking with them in their native Hebrew which they had been forced to learn in school.²⁸⁸

Kennedy describes the power of nonviolent direct action: “According to J. Kuttab, ‘The soldiers were really being torn apart, because they couldn’t handle that type of nonviolence.’ The Druze began to expose the vulnerability of military force to nonviolent means of struggle.”²⁸⁹ Kennedy explains the situation that Israeli soldiers faced and observes, “In the face of a disciplined unarmed civilian population, which threatened neither Israeli security, nor the lives of the individual soldiers, the morale and discipline of Israeli soldiers began to break down. According to several reports, the division commander complained that the Golan situation was ruining some of his best

²⁸⁶ Mara’i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 83–84.

²⁸⁷ Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works,’” <http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf>.

²⁸⁸ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 61.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

soldiers.”²⁹⁰ Kennedy describes how “a huge group of villagers once massed in the town square. An Israel official in a helicopter hovering above the crowd ordered the soldiers to fire on the crowd to disperse them. The soldiers refused the direct order.”²⁹¹

This case reveals asymmetry of nonviolent conflict, where Israel faced multiple nonviolent battlefields. Kennedy notes, “Another factor was the active support of a small but vocal sector of Israeli society which spoke out in defense of the Golani Druze civil and human rights and opposed the annexation.”²⁹²

4. Strategy

During the Druze resistance campaign, the Druze demonstrated an understanding of the implementation of nonviolent strategy. They used a variety of methods for nonviolent struggle, which included refusal to cooperate, boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, peaceful demonstrations and even creation of alternative institutions and infrastructure to preserve basic life conditions. The Druze had a clear objective: preservation of their identity.

Jonatan Kuttab, a Palestinian lawyer, explains the Druze’s indirect approach. “We don’t have a military option. It doesn’t pay for us to throw rocks or stones. We can never outviolence the Israeli army. But we can—through unity, cooperation and taking a principled stand, and accepting suffering—just refuse to cooperate and withhold our consent, and reasonably come to a solution that reserves and preserves our own rights and interests, at least in some measure.”²⁹³

As an example, soon after the Israelis demanded that the Druze accept identification cards, the Golan Druze community demonstrated its nonviolent fighting skills against Israel and even against their own people. According to Kennedy, “...opposition to the Israeli move solidified and those who accepted Israeli identity cards were often shunned by the entire community. ‘They decided that anyone who accepts

²⁹⁰ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 61.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 53–54.

²⁹² Ibid., 59.

²⁹³ Ibid., 48.

Israeli identity cards is really cutting themselves off from the community.’ ‘They are no longer one of us, no longer a Druze.’”²⁹⁴

The Druze launched a well-planned non-cooperation campaign. Kennedy explains that “Druze laborers refused to go to work, crippling industry in the North of Israel for several weeks. Many lost their jobs. Those who took Israeli identification continued to be ostracized. Nine village leaders, thought to be ‘ringleaders,’ were placed under administrative detention (imprisonment without trial).”²⁹⁵

Another important part of nonviolent struggle is the cohesion of the Druze community. Kennedy also notes, “When one village ran short of food, the villagers walked en masse to the neighboring village, overwhelming by sheer numbers the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers positioned there to prevent it.”²⁹⁶

During the non-cooperation campaign, the Druze continued to live their ordinary lifestyle, despite Israeli military interference. According to Kennedy, “the elderly and young violated curfew in order to harvest crops. Arrest of the elders created greater resolve among the villagers. When some of the children were arrested and carted off in helicopters, even more went out into the fields, hoping to get a free ride.”²⁹⁷ At first glance, this voluntary activity seeking individual imprisonment by the Druze could look abnormal, but this is one method of nonviolent struggle. Sharp states, “Actionists may deliberately disobey a particular regulation in order to be imprisoned, and may ask to be arrested even though police select others for arrest or even though the persons were not present on the original occasion. At times the objective is to fill the jails; that is called a jail-in.”²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 52.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 53.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 418.

Mubarak E. Awad states,” It is important to note that the residents of the Golan Heights did, in fact, boycott all Israeli goods and foods which they found it possible to do without, and have returned to reliance on local goods, plants, herbs, and other popular foods.”²⁹⁹

Mubarak E. Awad adds,

Another instance occurred when an Israeli court attempted to try six Syrian Druze in the Golan Heights for failure to possess and produce an identity card. Several thousand Druze congregated outside the court to hand themselves in, insisting that they were all guilty of the same ‘crime’ since they also refused to carry Israeli identity cards. It is clear that in both these, and in many other examples of support and solidarity, the authorities were prevented from achieving their aims. On the contrary, they created a strong sense of solidarity, a deeper unity and a more stubborn rejection of the Israeli practices.³⁰⁰

These various examples demonstrate the Druze’s deliberate use of nonviolent strategy.

5. Organization

The Druze community, being a religious sect, had established a social infrastructure and networks without international borders long before Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon. After a year, the government was not able to provide civil service to remote areas because of ongoing armed conflict. Judith Parik notes that at the same time, “In Druze areas chaotic conditions promoted an experiment with local, surrogate administration.”³⁰¹ Mara’i and Halabi note, “The Golani villages traditionally lived entirely by agriculture, and in recent decades the economy has come to be based almost exclusively on apple cultivation. Immediately upon occupation, the Israelis dissolved the ‘collective committees’ elected

²⁹⁹ Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” 32.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 33.

³⁰¹ Judith P. Parik, “Change and Continuity among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983–90,” in *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (July 1993): 379, <http://www.jstor/stable/4283573>.

in each village by the local farmers to coordinate with the government in Damascus on farming issues.

Bashar Tarabieh states, “Before 1981, the only independent organizations were sports clubs. In the aftermath of the strike, these clubs were used for political meetings and to host visiting solidarity groups. The strike inspired people to express themselves politically, and the sports clubs were the perfect venue. Male and female membership increased dramatically after the strike.”³⁰²

6. Narrative

The two main components in the master narrative of the Druze resistance campaign were victimization and vilification. The Israelis forced the Druze to accept a new identity. Kennedy notes, “One chief cause for its [the resistance’s] effectiveness was that the strike was rooted in a deep sense of the people’s identity: their identity as Druze. The symbol of their campaign was provided by the Israelis: the identity card. And the objective of their resistance was simple, attainable, and brought these elements together in a compelling way: if you are a Syrian Druze, you cannot be an Israeli, so don’t accept the identity card! It was as simple as that.” Kennedy points out the Arab Druze message: “We’re not fighting Israel, we cannot,” they said. “We’re not against Israel’s security interests. Israel can do whatever it wants to us: they can confiscate our land. They can kill us. But they cannot tell us who we are. They cannot change our identity.”³⁰³

7. Doctrine

The Druze demonstrated their collective understanding of strategic level nonviolent resistance and the importance of nonviolent discipline when their noncooperation campaign resulted in physical and economic suffering. Although the Druze had human casualties, however, these casualties never led to collective violent

³⁰² Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” 46.

³⁰³ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 53.

action.³⁰⁴ The Druze revealed Israel's poor preparation for dealing with nonviolent resistance. Kennedy states that,

The nonviolent resistance campaign of the Golani Druze is not a definitive demonstration of the efficacy of nonviolence. But it is a provocative example of the power of a well-disciplined nonviolent campaign against tremendous military might. It proved to be difficult to manage by the Israelis, who depend ultimately on cooperation with their rule in all of the occupied territories in order to maintain it. But, perhaps most significantly, it has embodied an alternative for the Palestinians under occupation in the wake of the Lebanese war and PLO infighting which have destroyed their military capability.³⁰⁵

8. Other Factors

During the resistance campaign, the Druze were supported by most of the international community. The UN General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 86 to 21, a resolution condemning Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights and calling for all governments to end all dealing with Israel.³⁰⁶ Meanwhile, ministers of the Arab states criticized the United States for supporting annexation of the Golan.³⁰⁷

C. SUMMARY

The outcome of the Druze nonviolent campaign was a partial success.³⁰⁸ The small Druze community maintained its distinctive status quo but had to carry Israeli identification cards. Kennedy concludes, "It is difficult to speculate how the strike would have been resolved if the war in Lebanon had not intervened."³⁰⁹ Israel represented an overwhelmingly powerful and coercive opponent. Even international sanctions did not have much impact on Israel's actions.

³⁰⁴ According to Mara'i and Halabi, in February 1982 the Druze had civilian casualties. Mara'i and Halabi note, "Some of the demonstrations turned violent: about thirty-five people were shot during clashes with the police." Mara'i and Halabi, "Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights," 84.

³⁰⁵ Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance," 61.

³⁰⁶ "Chronology January 16, 1982–April 15, 1982," 390.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, "Appendix, Table A.1 Nonviolent Campaigns," in *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, ed. Bruce Hoffman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 234.

³⁰⁹ Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance," 56.

In 1992 Mara'i and Halabi noted, “This is the situation as it stands today; Israel identifies the Syrians of the Golan as ‘residents of Israel,’ but not citizens.”³¹⁰ The Druze had a strategic consciousness and full understanding of the political environment, which is explained by their extensive use of the nonviolent battlefield. Mubarak E. Awad notes, “This campaign appears to be well organized, and intelligent in its methods, ideas, and the execution of classic non-violence tactics.”³¹¹

Despite of the partial success of the Druze resistance, the campaign revealed the weakness of Israel’s Army and the strong character of the Druze community. The Israeli military was not accustomed to conducting operations against a peaceful opponent who, using a civil resistance strategy, deliberately steered Israeli military forces onto an unconventional battlefield.

³¹⁰ Mara'i and Halabi, “Life under Occupation in the Golan Heights,” 84.

³¹¹ Awad, “Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories,” 22.

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VI. THE KOSOVO ALBANIAN RESISTANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1981

A. INTRODUCTION

Kosovo is a small Balkan area that covers 4,200 square miles and borders Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and ‘inner Serbia.’³¹² Kosovo has been the cradle of the conflict between Albanian Kosovars and the Serbian ethnic groups for centuries. The Serbs consider Kosovo as the birthplace of their nation, “‘the cradle of Serbian civilisation’ [sic], their ‘Jerusalem.’”³¹³ On the other hand, Kosovar Albanians consider Kosovo their homeland. In the 1980s, it had a population of two million of which about 90 percent were Albanian.³¹⁴

Kosovo Albanians had dominated in the region for two decades. Aleksander Petrovic and Dorde Stefanovic describe in detail Albanian domination in Kosovo during 1961–1981.³¹⁵ The turning point in Kosovo’s history was the 1980 death of Jozip Broz Tito, the communist statesman of the Yugoslavia Federation. Tito had maintained control over the political situation in communist Yugoslavia. Howard Clark describes Tito’s [political] attitude as “Weak Serbia, Strong Yugoslavia.”³¹⁶ The political situation started to change soon after Tito’s death.

³¹² Howard Clark, “Background on Kosovo,” in *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), xix, <http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/civil-resistance-in-kosovo.pdf>.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Carole Roger, “Where It All Began,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 17, no. 1, *Studies in the Social History of Destruction: The Case of Yugoslavia* (Fall, 2003): 169, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020202>.

³¹⁵ Aleksander Petrovic and Dorde Stefanovic note and classify Albanians’ ethnic domination during the 1961–1981 timeframe in Kosovo as follows. The overwhelming Albanian majority dominated state security, the Communist Party and the state sector and heavily influenced cultural institutions such as university and the Academy of Sciences. Albanian was the de facto official language and the Albanian flag was the nation’s official symbol. Aleksander Petrovic and Dorde Stefanovic, “Kosovo, 1944–1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist ‘Nested Homeland,’” *Europe Asia Studies* 62, no.7 (2010): 1078, doi:10.1080/09668136.2010.497016. Table 1. “Two Periodics of Ethnic Domination in Kosovo.” Note. The extracted information above is about Albanian domination (1969–1981) in Kosovo only.

³¹⁶ Howard Clark, “When the Dam Breaks,” in *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 15, <http://balkanwitness.glypx.com/civil-resistance-in-kosovo.pdf>.

In March and April 1981, Kosovo witnessed sporadic civil resistance by Albanian students at Pristina University. Among scholars, the resistance campaign still offers many unsolved questions, even myths. For example, still unknown is the death toll or identities of the leaders of failed riots. Patrick F. R. Arhsien and R. A. Howells stated in 1981, “As a result of these disturbances, 11 persons were reported killed, 57 injured and 22 arrested.”³¹⁷ Miranda Vickers writes in 1998, “Officially it was reported that eleven people had died, but Albanians say the true number was almost 1,000.”³¹⁸

Dava Norbu explains the roots of the conflict. “Traditionally Kosovo has been the ethno-homeland of Albanians. Most Albanians are Muslims and their language is of the Indo-European origin. They deeply resented Serbian hegemony in both Kosovo and Belgrade; it is one of the dynamics of Albanian Islamic nationalism. Following Tito’s death in 1981, the Albanians revolted; their slogan was ‘We are Albanians not Yugoslavs!’”³¹⁹ At the same time it must be noted that, according to Mertus, “Kosovo Albanians are both Muslim and Christians and that Kosovo Albanians have never identified themselves in terms of religious identity.”³²⁰

Ekavi Athanassopoulou wrote:

Kosovo, a province of Serbia, was granted significant autonomy under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. By the end of the 1970s, ethnic rivalry in the province was mounting, and in 1981 nationalist unrest among Kosovo Albanians produced large demonstrations aimed at achieving the status of a republic within the Yugoslav Federation, and thus independence from Serbia. The movement was crushed, and six years later the autonomous status of the province came under attack.”³²¹

³¹⁷ Patrick F. R. Arhsien and R. A. Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” *The World Today* 37, no. 11 (November 1981): 420, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395240>.

³¹⁸ Miranda Vickers, “Kosovo Flimsy Bridge-Building Role Collapses,” in *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 198.

³¹⁹ Dava Norbu, “The Serbian Hegemony, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Yugoslav Break-Up,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 34, no. 14 (April 3–9, 1999): 837, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4407822>.

³²⁰ Julie A Mertus, “The 1981 Student Demonstrations,” in *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 34.

³²¹ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, “Hoping for the Best, Planning for the Worst: Conflict in Kosovo,” *The World Today* 52, no. 8/9 (August–September 1996): 226, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40475849>.

1. Significance of the Case

The significance of the Kosovo Albanians' civil resistance is noteworthy because of its preconditions, failure and consequences. Riots in Kosovo caused huge damage to Kosovar Albanians and paved the road to future armed conflict in the 1990s. Julie Mertus quotes Albanian political stakeholders: "'The demonstrations were our handicap,' Mahmut Bakali would say in 1995. 'They were not needed at that time,' Azem Vllasi, an Albanian politician who appeared close to Milosević until his falling out in 1989, would agree, 'We weren't ready.' The 1981 demonstrations did more harm than good."³²²

In 1981, the Kosovar Albanians had almost perfect alignment of necessary and sufficient conditions to conduct successful civil resistance. Kosovo's society was out of balance, consistent with Chalmers Johnson's description of a disequilibrated social system.³²³ At that time, Kosovo experienced high levels of social poverty, unemployment and low income. In 1981, Kosovo was the poorest autonomous province in the Republic of Serbia of the Yugoslav Federation.³²⁴

Despite favorable conditions and Kosovar Albanians' collective desire for social change, the student civil resistance campaign was sporadic, uncontrolled and lacking in common goals. Kosovar Albanians, despite being the majority in Kosovo, had experienced victimization by the Yugoslav Federation since 1970 and 80 percent of the political dissidents in prison were Albanians.³²⁵ Kosovo Albanians are by nature a homogeneous crowd. Although they were ethnically cohesive, demonstrators failed to politically mobilize people.

³²² Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 46.

³²³ Chalmers Johnson, "The Disequilibrated Social System," in *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 1982), 61–90.

³²⁴ Arhsien and Howells, "Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots," 420.

³²⁵ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 76.

2. Synopsis

Howard Clark describes the simple cause and events of the first day of violent riots in Pristina University on March 11, 1981. More than 2,000 students participated.³²⁶ Clark states, “On 11 March 1981 a student in the university canteen found a cockroach in his soup. This sparked a protest that converged with a crowd leaving a football match.”³²⁷ Demonstrators did not control the escalating violence during the demonstration so students, instead of maintaining nonviolent discipline, stoned the police. Eighteen people were injured, including two security forces members.³²⁸ “I was afraid a revolution would break out,’ admitted party chief Mahmut Bakalli in a conversation in December 1991 to explain why he had called out the province’s security forces.”³²⁹ As the day progressed, it grew in militancy, ultimately being dispersed with arrests and tear gas. Hardly a word appeared in the Yugoslav press.³³⁰

Kohl and Libal elaborate. Students apparently moved towards the communist party main office. University professors and local stakeholders managed to cool them down and students started to turn back to the dormitories. Everything changed when a new group of 200 students arrived and demanded the release of their fellow students and shouted slogans against Kosovo party stakeholders. The police used tear gas but were stoned by students. The violent clash injured 16 students and 2 policemen.³³¹ This marked the beginning of a month-long Kosovar-Albanian student resistance campaign.

Pristina University students’ primary goal was to improve their living and welfare conditions. Carole Roger notes, “Their demands were relatively modest: edible cafeteria food and better, less crowded dormitories.”³³² According to Julie A. Mertus, the situation was peaceful for several weeks after the first riot until on March 25 a violent

³²⁶ Arhsien and Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” 419.

³²⁷ Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, “Kosovo, the Gordian Knot of the Balkans,” in *Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg*, ed. Robert Elsie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 54.

³²⁸ Ibid., 55.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 41–42.

³³¹ Kohl and Libal, “Kosovo, the Gordian Knot of the Balkans,” 54–55.

³³² Roger, “Where It All Began,” 167.

demonstration erupted, in the southern part of Kosovo in Prizren.³³³ Kohl and Libal cited a Serbian newspaper report that about thirty demonstrators in Prizren had conducted hooliganism. Bystanders did not join in the demonstrators' bandwagon. Instead, they harangued them.³³⁴

The next day a violent demonstration occurred again in Pristina, where Albanian students occupied dormitories.³³⁵ This time, students suffered casualties. Julie A. Mertus notes, "The Pristina daily *Rilindja* reported that thirty-five people were wounded and twenty-one students arrested in this second wave of protests."³³⁶ No one controlled students or the police.

According to Howard Clark, students organized a March 26 meeting near the university and planned to debate professors and local stakeholders, including politicians. At this point, students escalated their demands seeking better conditions overall. Serbian special police units expelled students from the university dormitories and later launched a frontal attack against student residences. The state media did not release any news in public about the ongoing riots in Pristina.³³⁷ Soon after this event, insurrections occurred all over Kosovo. Mertus describes the events as following:

No longer a student protest but a mass revolt, the unrest moved across Kosovo. Six cities erupted on April 1 and 2, bringing tens of thousands of miners, workers, teachers, students, civil servants, Albanians from all walks of life onto the streets. Rioters allegedly marched with young children in front, as shields, as they moved against the police, throwing rocks and smashing store windows. The federal government declared a state of emergency, bringing in federal troops and helicopters to patrol cities, major roadways and borders. Paratroopers occupied an airfield strip in Pristina; the entire province was sealed off; a curfew was imposed; schools and factories were closed and all signs of normal life came to a standstill. At one point up to thirty thousand federal troops patrolled the

³³³ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 30.

³³⁴ Kohl and Libal, *Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg*, 56.

³³⁵ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 30.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 42.

province; Kosovars experienced their presence as a “military occupation.”³³⁸

The government violence and random arrests against demonstrators had a boomerang effect. Mertus explains, “On April 3, demonstrations spread to Kosova Mitrovica, Vučitrn, and Uroševac from there to nearly every municipality within Kosovo. Yugoslav authorities accused the protesters of being armed.”³³⁹ Patrick F. R. Arhsien and R. A. Howells note, “The disturbances thus took on overt symptoms of Albanian nationalism and irredentism, in the form of slogans and demands for the elevation of Kosovo to the constitutional status of a republic and, in some extreme cases, for the unification of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia with neighboring Albania.”³⁴⁰

On April 6, Belgrade officials announced that for first time the casualty rate, “11 dead (including 2 policemen) and 57 injured.”³⁴¹ The next and final student demonstration was organized in Pristina on May 19. Once again, student dormitories were attacked and occupied by the Serbian security forces. Tear gas was used. Now, security forces expelled students from dormitories and ordered them to go home. In addition, the University Council was suspended.³⁴² The resistance was over.

The government showed no mercy to Kosovar Albanians who took part in civil resistance. From March to June there were seven hundreds arrests; in the next few months 226 of them received jail sentences, some as long as 15 years.³⁴³ The Albanian civil resistance campaign was a failure. The government started to root out the remaining potential resistance elements.

Clark notes that the “‘nest of nationalism,’ the [Pristina] university, was reined in. Students numbers were cut back by 25 percent and the curriculum was re-oriented away from humanities towards the sciences, a move seen as more in line with Kosovo’s

³³⁸ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 30.

³³⁹ Ibid, 31.

³⁴⁰ Arhsien and Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” 419.

³⁴¹ Kohl and Libal, *Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg*, 55.

³⁴² Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 42.

³⁴³ Ibid.,42.

economic needs as well as reducing the dangerous zone where nationalistic ideas thrived.”³⁴⁴ Clark adds, “Many Albanians, especially political activists, left the country.”³⁴⁵ In reality, many demonstrators who escaped from Kosovo to Albania (249 in 1981–1983) were caught and handed over to Yugoslav authorities.³⁴⁶

B. ANALYSIS

The 1981 Kosovo resistance was, ultimately, a failure. There are a number of reasons for this.

1. Leadership

The Kosovo student riots were spontaneous and did not have designated leadership. Even the government could not clearly identify who was responsible. Miranda Vickers describes the situation:

Provincial and other Yugoslav leaders continued to point the finger at “reactionary” and “counter-revolutionary” circles both inside and outside the country (political exiles). Kosovo’s state President Xhavid Nimani was more specific, naming the ‘Ballists’ headed by Abaz Ermeni, “Zogists” headed by Leka Zogu (son of Albania’s one-time self-proclaimed king Ahmed Zogu), and the so-called ‘extremist’ headed by Emil Fazliu.³⁴⁷

2. High Participation Level

The participation was relatively light. At their peak, the demonstrations involved tens of thousands people, although Kosovo’s Albanian population totaled 1,226,736 in 1981.³⁴⁸ In addition, Kosovo’s population was highly urbanized, which should have allowed rapid mobilization. Petrović and Stefanović state, “By 1980 ethnic Albanians

³⁴⁴ Howard Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 43.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., 44.

³⁴⁷ Vickers, “Kosovo Flimsy Bridge-Building Role Collapses,” 202.

³⁴⁸ Robert Elsie, “The Right to Self-Determination,” in *Kosovo in the Heart of the Powder Keg*. Table 1. Number of Albanians according to the census of 1981 and to estimates from 1991 (New York: Columbia University, 1997), 205.

comprised 92% of those employed in the state sector, while only 5% were Serbs....”³⁴⁹ In other words, the Albanians had perfect conditions to take political power away from the regime, but that did not happen. This shows that the majority of Albanians had serious commitment problems and, therefore, they were not able to conduct a broad-based campaign. The people remained loyal to the communists.³⁵⁰

Law-abiding people do not support hooliganism or unrealistic political demands. For example, Mertus notes that the majority of Albanians living in Kosovo did not support Kosovo’s unification with Albania.³⁵¹ Mertus adds, “Furthermore, with respect to the 1981 demonstrations, some *khojas* (Islamic leaders) in Kosovo had explicitly refused to support the protests.”³⁵²

Gene Sharp notes that student movements start with one strike against them: “Struggles conducted predominantly by students are sometimes weaker than is required for success if they do not gain support from other important sectors of the population...The mobilization of workers, the middle class, peasants and farmers, communications and transportation operators, higher economic groups, and government functionaries can give the movement considerably greater power.”³⁵³ In Kosovo, students failed to win over uncommitted parties at the state level because of sporadic violence. Many parties trusted the opponent, the Kosovo Communist Party instead.

³⁴⁹ Petrovic and Stefanovic, “Kosovo, 1944–1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist ‘Nested Homeland,’” 1097.

³⁵⁰ Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no.7, 1135–1152, doi: 10.1080/09668136.2010.497022.

³⁵¹ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 30.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 33.

³⁵³ Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 345.

3. Regime Loyalty Shift

The Kosovo riots never induced loyalty shift.³⁵⁴ Conditions for regime loyalty shift were good but the opportunity for security forces defection was already lost on the first day, March 11. Students in Pristina insulted Kosovo Communist Party leaders and shouted antigovernmental slogans, instead of relaying the real problem to officials. Students, knowingly or unknowingly, had stepped into high politics and the Kosovo Communist Party Chief Mahmut Bakali called up the police.

The party controlled strategic mobilization resources such as mass media and infrastructure; moreover, it was in charge of security forces. Albanians accounted for two-thirds of the League of Communists in Kosovo by 1981 and about 75 percent of the police force.³⁵⁵ On March 26, Rahman Morina, Kosovo minister of the interior, requested official help against the demonstrations.³⁵⁶ Demonstrators could not disseminate information about their real grievances and problems, and therefore could not create sympathy among security forces.

4. Strategy

The Kosovo civil resistance did not have a strategy. It did not seek consensus on how to solve the original problem. The spontaneous movement had no designated leadership or formal umbrella organization. There was no one to decide on strategy. Julie Mertus explains, “According to interviews with participants, there was little advance knowledge of the action—nor could there have been—as police would have disrupted the protest before it began. Most students who joined in the demonstrations say that they just happened to be at the university when they heard and saw fellow students beginning to gather.”³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ Erica Chenoweth, “Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 64, <http://www.ericachenoweth.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/WCRWAppendix-1.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ Roger D. Petersen, “Yugoslavia,” in *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, ed. Margaret Levi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 220–221.

³⁵⁶ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 58.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., 29.

Gene Sharp explains the importance of strategic planning when he says, “All strategic planning...requires that the resistance planners have a profound understanding of entire conflict situation, including attention to physical, historical, governmental, military, culture, social, political, psychological, economic, and international factors. Strategies can only be developed in the context of the particular struggle and its background.”³⁵⁸ A clear indication of the lack of civil resistance strategy was the unrealistic demands for political transformation.

5. Organization

The civil resistance was handicapped by not having pre-established organization. Julie Mertus states, “Although the March 11 demonstrations were planned by *someone*, most Albanians believe that *someone* to be a group of students.”³⁵⁹

Five covert resistance groups/cells with different political goals were present before the demonstrations or were formed soon after the failed resistance. Three groups, the National Liberation of Kosovo, the Group of Marxist Leninists of Kosovo and the Red Front, wanted Kosovo-Albania unification. Other groups, such as the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist of Yugoslavia and the Movement for an Albanian Republic in Yugoslavia, wanted republic status for Kosovo.³⁶⁰ It is unclear what role any of these organizations had in the demonstrations. According to Mertus, the one clear thing was that most Albanians denied any relationship with the various organizations because of fear. Moreover, many people did not join the demonstrations just because of the Marxist-Leninist overtones.³⁶¹

Howard Clark has come to the same conclusion. The “first demonstrations were not organized by dissident cells inside Kosovo. Of the ‘counter-revolutionary groups’ in Kosovo detected by Yugoslav police in 1985, more than two thirds were formed *after the*

³⁵⁸ Gene Sharp, “Planning Strategy,” in *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 4th U.S. (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 47, <http://www.aeinsteinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf>.

³⁵⁹ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 34.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 20.

³⁶¹ Ibid., 34–35.

demonstrations. Rather, the process has been likened to a ‘*national awakening*.’”³⁶² Even government officials had a hard time finding the organizations that could be held responsible for the riots.

6. Narrative

The civil resistance movement did not control the main narrative. Strategic-level messages were shaped by the journalists. Julie Mertus explains the ongoing situation. “Regardless, once the media blackout was lifted, local journalists would zero in on these more controversial signs, presenting them as the demonstrators’ key political demands.”³⁶³ Mass media were under the control of the Kosovo League of Communist Provincial Committee.

The resistance campaign had a deceptive main narrative mixed with unrealistic political demands. For example, protesters demanded Kosovo’s unification with Albania but most Albanians did not want that. The students’ real demands vanished during the campaign and were reshaped by the Communist Party or local journalists based on placards and slogans.

Julie Mertus describes demonstrators’ various slogans and placards:

The Crowd shouted slogans and carried placards demanding “Kosovo Republic,” “Stop the Exploitation of Trepča” [a mine in Kosovo], “Protect the Rights of Albanians Outside Kosovo,” “Improve Living Conditions for Students and Workers,” “Stop Repression, Free Political Prisoners,” “Down with the Greater-Serbia Chauvinism.” Some demonstrators also were reported to have boasted pro-Albania messages, such as: “We are Enver Hoxha’s Soldiers,” “Down with Revisionism, Long Live Marxism-Leninism,” “We are Albanians, Not Yugoslavians,” and “We Want United Albania!”³⁶⁴

Howard Clark offers an excellent example when he notes that,

...no matter how many small groups adopted names echoing Enverist ideology, the fierce atheism and general authoritarianism of the Hoxha

³⁶² Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 44.

³⁶³ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 31.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

regime and the country's poverty made immediate unification unattractive. A placard such as the reported, "We are Enver Hoxha's soldiers" was not proposing a political programme, but striking a pose.³⁶⁵

The variety of political messages created strategic-level confusion and instantly backfired. Most of the slogans were not related to the original welfare problem raised by the students. The demonstrations were labeled by Yugoslav officials as counterrevolutionary, which was a huge blow.³⁶⁶ "The Federal Secretary of Internal Affairs, Stane Dolance, declared: 'Albanian irredentists are now showing their true face, they no longer talk about a republic but say 'long live Enver Hoxha.' It is quite clear that what is really involved is the integrity of the Yugoslav State.'"³⁶⁷

7. Doctrine

Demonstrators had little nonviolent discipline. In fact, their violence diminished the potential of any loyalty shift by the security forces. Attacks on the police made them become brutal. According to Kohl and Libal, Albanian bystanders witnessed Albanian and Serbian forces killing demonstrators. The Albanian security members were trusted members of the Communist party.³⁶⁸

Gene Sharp writes, "Where discipline is weak or absent, there is danger that a nonviolent demonstration may, in a tense situation, lead to major riot which would most likely both shift attention from the original grievance and also alienate support."³⁶⁹ The demonstrators' lack of nonviolent discipline cost them the sympathy of the Kosovo people.

Riots that occurred in Kosovo were in some cases just hooliganism, driven by students and later by laborers who had different political views and demands. Julie Mertus concludes that, "Several Kosovo Serbs who witnessed the demonstrations described the crowd as 'bewildered' and not knowing what they were doing. The press at

³⁶⁵ Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*, 44.

³⁶⁶ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 45.

³⁶⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, 198.

³⁶⁸ Kohl and Libal, *Kosovo, in the Heart of the Powder Keg*, 63–64.

³⁶⁹ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 616.

that time described the crowd in identical terms.”³⁷⁰ Maria Vickers describes the demonstrators’ violent action on March 16 in Pristina. “This time, Serb and Montenegrin citizens were beaten, their homes and businesses burned, and their shops looted. Kosovo’s Serb population was now seriously alarmed.”³⁷¹ The demonstrators unknowingly, through violent acts, had diminished the potential for external third-party support and cooperation.

Another strategic mistake was the demonstrators’ failure to use nonviolent methods beyond strikes and mass demonstrations. Gene Sharp argues, “The common error of past improvised political defiance campaigns is the reliance on only one or two methods, such as strikes and mass demonstrations.”³⁷²

8. Other Factors

Several lesser factors, described in the following paragraphs, played a role, as well.

Political Opportunity

During the resistance campaign, limited symbolic external support was provided by fellow Albanians living in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, where people conducted pro-Albanian demonstrations.³⁷³ The support diminished quickly. Julie Mertus notes, “In Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia proper and Kosovo, Slavs began to boycott Albanian owned stores and bakeries, cutting their sales by as much as 85 percent.”³⁷⁴ Weak narrative and poor strategic decisions were responsible for the lack of widespread support.

³⁷⁰ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 66.

³⁷¹ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, 197.

³⁷² Gene Sharp, “Exercising Power,” in *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 4th U.S. ed. (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004):30, <http://www.aeinsteinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf>.

³⁷³ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 31.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., 41.

Media

Foreign media, such as *The Washington Post*, *The Economist*, *The New York Times* and *The Christian Science Monitor* covered the ongoing civil resistance campaign, but this reporting did not generate support from the international community.³⁷⁵ The narrative remained unclear internationally.

Demographics

The university had 36,000 students as of 1981 and an additional 18,000 in extension programs. Most students studied humanities and therefore had a hard time finding jobs after graduation.³⁷⁶ Miranda Vickers comments, “[T]he majority of Albanian students were enrolled for courses in the liberal arts curricula studying Islamic art or Albanian history and folklore, and Kosovo’s economy could not absorb such abundance of graduates in these subjects.”³⁷⁷ Julie Mertus writes, “Kosovo had the dubious honor of having the highest ratio of both students and illiterates in Yugoslavia. The Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo found its most vocal supporters and leaders among the young, educated unemployed.”³⁷⁸ Aleksander Petrović and Dorde Stefanović note the importance of the high concentration of youth: “In 1981, 52% of the inhabitants of Kosovo were under 20 years of age, and ratio of students per 1,000 inhabitants was 274.6 in Kosovo and 194.9 in Yugoslavia as a whole.”³⁷⁹

This also partly explains why demonstrators preferred violent civil resistance. Unlike the youth demographic, politically mature people knew that mass mobilization against a regime could result in violent struggle. Mass violence means military involvement, and the Yugoslav Federation had the third largest army in Europe.

³⁷⁵ Benjamin C. Works, “News from Kosovo,” *Sirius: The Strategic Issues Research Institute*, <http://www.kosovo.net/press1980.html>.

³⁷⁶ Roger, “Where It All Began,” 167.

³⁷⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, 199.

³⁷⁸ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 29.

³⁷⁹ Petrovic and Stefanovic, “Kosovo, 1944–1981: The Rise and the Fall of a Communist ‘Nested Homeland,’” 1096.

C. SUMMARY

The Kosovo civil resistance movement of 1981 was a failure. Gene Sharp helps to explain the first strategic mistake: “By placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have superiority. The dictators are equipped to apply violence overwhelmingly.”³⁸⁰ The students’ chose to use violent struggle against the Albanian Communist Party, the strongest legitimate organization in Kosovo.

During the riots, the demonstrators had different demands and slogans, demonstrating that there was no common goal, organization, leadership or strategy. It was a total mess, with demonstrators belonging to different groups expressing political demands that did not align with the real issues raised by the Pristina University students. This created a nightmare in strategic-level messaging.

The demonstrators lost the information war from the beginning. The students could not create what Gene Sharp defines as “cause-consciousness”³⁸¹ to justify their acts of disobedience. Lack of strategic-level communication between governmental officials and the wider audience existed.

In conclusion, the students expressed their grievances the wrong way. Miranda Vickers notes, “However, by all accounts the disturbances were a far cry from a revolution in any sense of the word. Pristina’s huge student body, which spent much of its time roaming the central avenues of the city, created the perfect conditions for the eruption of discontent. This very large number of students represented a political and social time-bomb.”³⁸² But, they lacked direction.

³⁸⁰ Gene Sharp, “Facing Dictatorships Realistically,” in *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 4th U.S. ed. (East Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), 4, <http://www.aeinsteinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FDTD.pdf>.

³⁸¹ Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 336.

³⁸² Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 34–35.

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VII. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

In this chapter, I compare the critical requirements of civil resistance identified in Chapter II and the four case studies to examine the validity of the hypotheses. The primary hypothesis and supportive hypotheses help answer the research question, *what are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation?*

A. THE PRIMARY HYPOTHESIS

The primary hypothesis is that effective civil resistance can be a critical part of a strategy for total defense under occupation. The research and the case studies indicate that resistance can be a critical part of a broader strategy and can be mixed with a military campaign for total defense under occupation.

The Cedar Revolution, the Singing Revolution and the Druze Resistance suggest that civil resistance is an effective strategy when armed resistance is impossible or overly expensive and the opposition is clearly a superior force. All three case studies demonstrate that civil resistance offers an extremely broad range of tactics that can effectively create an asymmetrical conflict, in which the opposition's military superiority is diminished.

Also, it is relatively easy to mobilize the citizenry for a nonviolent campaign compared to a violent conflict. Civil resistance, in turn, can mobilize the population for future violent struggle if necessary.

1. Supporting Hypotheses

The supporting hypotheses provide the “how” for the primary hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Civil resistance needs decentralized leadership to be successful.

The empirical research presented in Chapter II suggests that the presence of leadership is paramount. Analysis of the case studies strongly supports this hypothesis and reveals the importance of leadership. For instance, the leadership played a critical part during the Cedar Revolution. Leaders were responsible for strategic messaging and

initiating a peaceful resistance movement. For example, influential politician Samir Frangieh declared the beginning of the *peaceful* resistance campaign. In addition, the *La Chamber Noire* working group was responsible for the campaign planning, financing and cooperation with the students, who represented revolutionary muscle at Martyrs' Square.

The Singing Revolution had strong leaders who were easily identified such as Edgar Savisaar, Marju Lauristin, Mart Laar, Tunne Kelam, Lagle Parek, Heiki Ahonen and Tiit Maddrisson.³⁸³ The leadership initiated political mobilization through different events, such as The Popular Front Harta (declaration) in 1988 to support perestroika, “Song of Estonia 88” and The Baltic Chain event.

The Singing Revolution leadership was decentralized. The original leadership established support cells or local chapters that in turn created need for lower-echelon leadership. For example, the Popular Front’s decentralized leadership settled in the regional councils and support cells all over the country. The Heritage Society’s decentralized leadership was located in numerous clubs.

The Druze resistance, in turn, demonstrates efficiency and the viability of decentralized leadership. Israel detained Druze leaders during the Druze resistance campaign but could not neutralize emerging guerilla theater activities organized by the decentralized Druze leadership. During the resistance, decisions for action were made by the community, but behind the scenes young secular leaders including students and ex-prisoners were shaping the decision making and execution of the civil resistance campaign.

A lack of leadership was one of the reasons the resistance failed in Kosovo. Without leaders, the movement was spontaneous and did not have strategic-level political consciousness. There was no leadership to foster peaceful civil resistance or construct political messages and justify actions. Without leadership, the students did not understand the strategy or capabilities and restrictions necessary for successful non-violence on civil resistance. In summary, the research and case studies strongly support the hypothesis that successful civil resistance needs a decentralized leadership.

³⁸³ Vesilind, *The Singing Revolution*, 110–111.

Hypothesis 2: The higher the participation level, the greater the effectiveness of civil resistance.

The Cedar Revolution's high participation level clearly supports this hypothesis through several examples. The Cedar Revolution had more than one million participants.³⁸⁴ High numbers made civil resistance effective because demonstrators outnumbered the security forces, thereby creating a significant level of legitimacy. Syrian forces were forced to leave Lebanon. Secondly, the fact that many demonstrators were members of different associations increased the effectiveness of the resistance and launched paralyzing social boycotts against the regime.

The Singing Revolution offers similar examples. For instance, 150,000 people supported an initiated self-managing economic program in 1988 and forced the Estonian Communist Party who opposed the program to cooperate.³⁸⁵ The high participation level made the program legitimate. The program later allowed the Popular Front to create support cells, which in turn increased participation and national-level political mobilization. Another example is the “Song of Estonia 88” event with hundreds of thousands of participants. High participation at the event created legitimacy for the movement.

The Druze resistance had a high participation level. That allowed a continuing non-cooperation campaign even under an Israeli blockade. The high participation level allowed the Druze to use swarming tactics. They outnumbered Israeli soldiers who had been sent to the Golan Heights to conduct blockades in different villages. Despite the Israeli efforts, the Druze delivered supplies to the villages.³⁸⁶ Israel employed 14,000–15,000 soldiers to control the situation in the Golan Heights.³⁸⁷ The Druze high participation level made civil resistance effective despite Israel's overwhelming military power. Kosovan civil resistance, on the other hand, did not have a high participation

³⁸⁴ Stephan, *Muslim Women in War and Crisis*, 178.

³⁸⁵ Ruutsoo, *Rahvarinne 1988*, 265.

³⁸⁶ Kennedy, “The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance,” 53.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., 55.

level. The movement could not gain popular support. The research indicates that civil resistance with a low participation level is likely to fail.

Hypothesis 3: Likelihood of civil resistance success is directly related to regime loyalty shift.

The research in Chapter II demonstrates that regime loyalty shift may increase civil resistance success. The Singing Revolution does offer some examples of loyalty shift that made civil resistance more effective. For instance, in 1988 the new Estonian Communist Party leader, Vaino Valjas, officially supported civil resistance. In 1990, the Communist Party lost legitimacy when most of the members left, which allowed the Popular Front to take the leading role in the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. In Kosovo, extensive violence by the movement failed to gain sympathy for regime supporters.

Empirical research in Chapter II indicates that regime loyalty shift can increase civil resistance effectiveness, but regime loyalty shift was a factor only in the Singing Revolution, where the communist party leadership changed sides but the security forces did not until 1991. Within the confines of the case studies, regime loyalty shift does not seem to improve the likelihood of successful civil resistance. More important are decentralized leadership, strategy, narrative and organization.

Hypothesis 4: Civil resistance can be an effective component of total defense when it is integrated with and nested within a broader strategy.

While the four civil resistance campaigns studied in this thesis were not explicitly combined with military campaigns, they did serve broad political strategies. The Cedar Revolution and the Druze resistance leadership utilized a non-cooperation strategy that included a civil resistance component. Lebanon's President Emil Lahoud was forced to step down because of civil resistance. The Druze utilized effective civil resistance tactics that were integrated into a peaceful noncooperation campaign. In contrast to other cases, the Singing Revolution's mainstream movement, The Popular Front, used a cooperation strategy with the Estonian Communist Party in order to infiltrate the Supreme Soviet of Estonia. Effective civil resistance forced the communists to cooperate and later shift loyalty. The Estonian National Independence Party and The Heritage Society utilized civil resistance but not a broad cooperation strategy. The research and examples from the

cases strongly support the idea that civil resistance can be integrated and nested within a broader strategy. It does not mean that the resistance movement's broad strategy cannot use violence, but civil resistance must remain disciplined and integrated in a broad strategy.

Hypothesis 5: Civil resistance is more effective when it is embedded in existing, informal social networks and organizations.

The case studies strongly suggest that existing organizations and social networks are a critical requirement for successful civil resistance. In particular, the Cedar Revolution and the Singing Revolution relied on strong existing organizations and networks.

The Cedar Revolution strongly supports the third hypothesis. The case study reveals that organizations such as the Beirut Merchants' Association and the Lebanese Bar Association and labor unions were responsible for the nationwide social boycott.³⁸⁸ Sectarian communities also played an important role in political mobilization.

The Singing Revolution offers an excellent example supporting this hypothesis. On January 16, 1988, the head of the Estonian Communist Party, Karl Vaino, explained how the resistance movement was using already established social and informal networks and organizations at the grassroots level. He pointed out that the political opposition was nested in different newspapers, national television and radio.³⁸⁹ Vaino's speech was an accurate illustration of the situation. Many communist party members joined the resistance. Membership in the communist party was necessary for those who wanted to work in most governmental position; therefore, many resistance participants were party members.

The Druze resistance campaign in the Golan Heights in 1981, despite being classified as only partially successful, demonstrated that existing informal networks were crucial for the movement's development. Among the Druze, loyalty to local religious

³⁸⁸ Rudy Jaagar and Maria J. Stephan, "Lebanon's Independence Intifada: How an Unarmed Insurrection Expelled Syrian Forces," in *Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East*, ed. Maria J. Stephan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 174.

³⁸⁹ Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 217–218.

leaders is paramount, and in the past, the Druze often have opposed coercive regimes.³⁹⁰ The Druze community has a unique religious structure and network. The strong social identity and communal bonds allowed successful mobilization of large numbers of people.³⁹¹ A case study of the 1981 Kosovo student riots clearly indicates that weak networks were partially responsible for its failure.

Hypothesis 6: A narrative based on national glorification, victimization, and targeted vilification of the enemy can motivate and sustain effective civil resistance.

Social movement theory emphasizes narrative as an important part of civil resistance. Civil resistance movements, successes and failures alike, typically have a narrative.

The Singing Revolution and the Cedar Revolution both carried a strong master narrative of victimization and injustice. The illegitimate occupation by the Soviet Union, deliberate pollution of nature, and crimes against humanity such as mass deportations, motivated hundreds of thousands of Estonians to participate in a civil resistance campaign. In Lebanon, the story of Syria's illegitimate occupation and political killings triggered civil resistance against Syria and its puppet government in Lebanon. The Druze resistance master narrative was the Israeli government's insistence on the Druze giving up their identity.

In Kosovo, one reason for the failure of civil resistance was an incoherent and inconsistent narrative, with some elements pushing for Kosovan independence and others veering off into student rights issues. Some protestors were seeking release of political prisoners while others argued for protection of the rights of Albanians outside Kosovo. It did nothing to invite support from third parties or national security forces. For example, Kosovo's Communist Party leader Mahmut Bakalli considered the civil resistance movement to be counter-revolutionary. Overall, the case studies validate this hypothesis as an important requirement for civil resistance.

³⁹⁰ Nina Landfield Ostrovitz, "Who Are the Druze," *World Affairs* 146, no. 3, *Subnational Conflict* (Winter 1983–84): 272–273, <http://www.jstor/stable/20671992>.

³⁹¹ Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance," 58.

Hypothesis 7: A doctrine of incremental and proportional violence through primarily unarmed means can increase the effectiveness of civil resistance.

The case studies support this hypothesis. Civil resistance campaigns like the Singing Revolution, the Cedar Revolution and the Druze resistance maintained and utilized the doctrine of disciplined action mostly through nonviolent means to gain their popular legitimacy.

The Singing Revolution offers a good example of the doctrine of disciplined nonviolence. In 1988, within a short period, the Popular Front quickly grew into a mainstream movement because its support cells mushroomed all over Estonia. The Popular Front deliberately and officially fostered the doctrine of disciplined nonviolence in its *Harta* declaration. Tens of thousands of people joined the movement and created the Popular Front support cells. Later, many members participated in the “Song of Estonia 88,” which was the groundbreaking event during the Singing Revolution. More than 200,000 Estonians took part.³⁹²

The Cedar Revolution offers another example. Despite Lebanon’s multifaceted sectarian warlike culture and violent past, the Cedar Revolution did not experience violence. Again, Samir Frangieh, one of the civil resistance leaders, fostered the doctrine of nonviolence and discipline when he announced that the people should wage a peaceful intifada.³⁹³

The student movement in Kosovo failed to maintain discipline, which backfired and caused a loss of legitimacy. Violence did not represent any of the students’ values and repelled potential supporters, such as Islamic leaders in Kosovo, who opposed the movement instead.³⁹⁴ The intended audience, such as laborers in the state sector, perceived the violence negatively and remained loyal to the communists.³⁹⁵ It should be noted that without organization or media attention, a civil resistance strategy might fail to

³⁹² Laar, Ott, and Endre, *Teine Eesti*, 418.

³⁹³ Jaagar and Stephan, *Civilian Jihad*, 172.

³⁹⁴ Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, 33.

³⁹⁵ Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took Up Arms against the Serbian Regime: The Genesis and Expansion of the UÇK in Kosovo,” 1135–1152.

achieve its intended effect, creating a political backfire. Kosovo's Communist Party labeled the students' activity counter-revolutionary. The case studies suggest that this hypothesis is valid. Incremental violence was not observed in the case studies and, thus, its effectiveness is not fully supported.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESTONIA

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

History has shown that small states involved in armed conflict against an overwhelming powerful enemy must wage a total war for survival. Small states cannot rely solely on their conventional military forces or coalition support but must use the entire nation's military and nonmilitary capabilities. Estonia, even as a NATO member, must take the possibility of occupation seriously and should not rely on outside support for national survival.

The following proposals are presented for how a civil resistance strategy can be operationalized in Estonia.

1. Leadership

National authorities must prepare and educate local officials on how to conduct a successful civil resistance campaign during military conflict and under occupation. The Estonian National Defense Course, the main course for national-level leaders, should include the study of civil resistance and its principles. The leadership must create civil resistance campaign plans that the leadership can execute with or without military involvement. It is necessary to create multiple decentralized leadership structures, where independent leadership can conduct civil resistance without the government.

Estonian government officials, along with those in exile and local municipal officials, must be trained to develop a localized and coordinated civil resistance campaign in case of occupation, so they are able to launch a decentralized civil resistance campaign against an occupying regime.

2. High Participation Level

Estonia, with its vibrant civil society and associational life, has favorable preconditions to achieve high participation levels in case of a civil resistance campaign. Estonia has high civil liberties and political rights index according to Freedom House, which ranks nations in these areas.³⁹⁶

I propose to include existing associations that foster Estonian culture and heritage. For example, “Song of Estonia, 88” successfully demonstrated that participation levels can be raised through collective folklore and singing events. The Estonian Folk Dance and Folk Music Association (ERSS) has approximately 26,000 members, including 1,600 dance and folk groups. In addition, over 300 folk music groups with more than 1,000 musicians are active.³⁹⁷ It must be noted that the Estonian population is 1,300,000 people. The ERSS can mobilize family members, relatives and friends, which potentially can raise the participation level up to hundreds of thousands of people. For example, the expected ERSS mobilization capability for the Song and Dance Celebration in July 2014 in Tallinn includes over 8,000 folk dancers, more than 20,000 singers and an audience of 100,000.³⁹⁸

In addition, other associations and organizations can help achieve a high participation level. They include the Federation of Estonian Student Unions, the Estonian Teachers Association, the Estonian Education Personnel Union, the Central Union of Estonian Farmers, the Association of Information Technology and Telecommunication, the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Estonian Council of Churches and the Estonian Actor’s Association. These associations and organizations already have high membership and decentralized regional unions. They also have overlapping social networks at the national and international levels. The Estonian government must establish closer routine ties with these existing networks to prepare itself for effective civil resistance.

³⁹⁶ *FreedomHouse*, <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/estonia#.U18WaVdpdKQ>

³⁹⁷ *Estonian Folk Dance and Folk Music Association*, <http://www.errs.ee/index.php?id=10355>.

³⁹⁸ *Visitestonia.com*, <http://www.visitestonia.com/en/things-to-see-and-do-in-estonia/cultural-holiday-in-estonia/song-celebrations-and-song-festival-traditions>.

3. Organization

Estonia should exploit established national-level institutions such as the National Security and Defense Coordination Unit, the National Defense Committee, the Estonian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Culture. These organizations should create working groups to operationalize civil resistance among different organizations and associations. Civil resistance must be fostered in the Estonian Defense Forces; specifically, the voluntary Estonian Defense League and its sub-organizations such as the Women's Voluntary Defense Organization, the Young Eagles and the Home Daughters.

The Defense League should include civil resistance as a key nonmilitary task because it offers a unique opportunity for people and social subcultures to participate even if they are not able or willing to bear arms. The Defense League should not be a military-centric organization. In addition, government organizations such as the Estonian Folk Culture Center under the Ministry of Culture, the University of Tartu Viljandi Culture Academy, and the Estonian Folk Dance and Folk Music Association should be included. Other associations, such as hunters groups, volunteer fire departments and sport clubs are potential organizations for civil resistance. These organizations can use existing social ties with other international civil resistance and nongovernmental organizations.

4. Strategy

Traditionally, the Estonian military has not recognized the utility of civil resistance as a national defense tool, but the evidence strongly suggests that civil resistance has great potential in national defense policy to ultimately defeat a stronger opponent. Civil resistance needs to be part of the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia. Civil resistance must be planned in peacetime. In case of occupation, planned civil resistance can be used independently or combined with a broader military campaign to create a unified strategy to set the conditions for effective low-intensity conflict. A successful civil resistance campaign would substantially raise the cost of occupation, and gain international support. Civil resistance would create an unconventional battlefield that would be the second line of defense.

Civil resistance should be added to the National Defense Strategy as a course of action. It is strategically wise to use the maximum capacity of the Estonian civilian population and prepare to wage a national-level civil resistance campaign in case of occupation. Civil resistance can prevent the creation of a puppet government or deny its legitimacy.

Civil resistance policy should be added to the national defense textbook. In the same vein, civil resistance should be part of peacetime national defense education in upper secondary schools and in the Estonian Defense Forces conscript training and other state institutions. As Robert L. Helvey observes, “People need to understand clearly that they hold the very sources of power that a tyrant uses to suppress them, and that the people can, collectively, deny those sources to the ruler, making liberation possible.”³⁹⁹

5. Narrative

Estonia’s history is rich in civil resistance. Estonians won their freedom from Soviet occupation largely as a result of successful civil resistance and the choices made by Gorbachev. In the Singing Revolution, hundreds of thousands mobilized to demonstrate their objections to the Soviet regime. Given that history, it is reasonable to expect that great numbers of Estonians could be mobilized against a new occupying force by invoking the success of past civil resistance. The narrative should also incorporate recent Russian activities in and around Ukraine in order to emphasize the possibility of foreign interference or occupation.

6. Doctrine

A doctrine that emphasizes discipline and an incremental nonviolent campaign must be fostered in peacetime training and education. Civil resistance exercises designed to train the use of resistance methods must be conducted by grassroots-level organizations. Civil resistance literature, pamphlets and manuals must be translated into the Estonian language and disseminated to the population through open Internet websites

³⁹⁹ Robert L. Helvey “Some Final Thoughts,” in *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals* (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution 2004), 143.

for self-education purposes. The Ministry of Defense and other official institutions should have civil resistance sections on their official websites.

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IX. CONCLUSION

The focus of this thesis is to identify critical requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation. While every civil resistance campaign is unique and has different combinations of critical factors that determine success or failure, the case studies suggest that existing networks, decentralized leadership and disciplined strategy are most commonly associated with success.

In the first chapter, I discussed the purpose of the thesis research and the specific problem faced by small states, bringing Estonia's comprehensive defense strategy into focus. I found that the Estonian comprehensive defense strategy includes civil support but does *not* include civil resistance. I concluded that Estonia's national defense strategy has not recognized the potential of civil resistance as a form of unconventional warfare that can be an effective component of Estonia's comprehensive state defense strategy. This chapter also presented the research question: *What are the requirements for successful civil resistance under occupation?*

In the second chapter, I explained the concept of civil resistance and how it was defined in Chapter I. The chapter includes comparative analysis of civil resistance, social movement, and irregular warfare literature. Scholars of civil resistance have identified factors that they consider critical for success, which I identified and compared. The analyzed factors were then distilled to create a common set of requirements for successful civil resistance and to propose my own list of critical requirements. In the second chapter, I concluded that the critical requirements are leadership, high participation level, regime loyalty shift, strategy, organization and networks, narrative and doctrine.

In the third to sixth chapters, four civil resistance cases were analyzed to validate or refute the proposed hypotheses listed in the first chapter. The case studies were analyzed using the critical requirement list identified in the second chapter. In the hypothesis testing chapter, the validity of the primary and supporting hypotheses were carefully examined. Recommendations regarding how Estonia should proceed with a

total defense strategy using civil resistance were offered. Further research on how to operationalize civil resistance in Estonia in case of occupation is needed.

In conclusion, this thesis has shown that a successful civil resistance campaign must satisfy the identified critical requirements and that a civil resistance strategy combined with unconventional military action can be an effective component of a total defense strategy. Civil resistance can be combined with overt military action or used independently. Civil resistance offers an alternative strategy to insurgency or armed resistance. Existing research supports this conclusion.

Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash conclude that combining civil resistance with military campaigns has succeeded during occupation on several occasions. Roberts and Ash cite the resistance campaign faced by the Apartheid Republic of South Africa in 1983–1994. The Apartheid regime encountered insurgency. This mixed strategy was successful and the white minority government was replaced.⁴⁰⁰ The same strategy was used successfully in the Northern Ireland civil resistance campaign of 1967–1972.⁴⁰¹ Michael Beer notes the use of mixed strategy in Burma, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Romania, South Africa and Palestine.⁴⁰²

In summary, civil resistance can be an effective component of a total defense strategy when combined with military action under the occupation. Civil resistance strategy offers to small states an option to defend or continue effective unconventional warfare in case of occupation.

⁴⁰⁰ Tom Lodge, “The Interplay of Non-violent and Violent Action in the Movement against Apartheid in South Africa, 1983–1994,” in *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Oxford University Press), 213–230.

⁴⁰¹ Richard English, “Northern Ireland, 1967–72,” in *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Oxford University Press), 75–90.

⁴⁰² Michael A. Beer, “Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a Unified Strategy Workable?” in *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*, ed. Stephan Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 174–184.

APPENDIX A: LIST OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS

Table 2. List of Nonviolent Campaigns

Campaign	Location	Target	Start	End	Outcome
Intifada	Sudan	Jaafar Nimiry	1985	1985	Success
	Palestine	Israel Occupation	1987	1990	Partial Success
	Zambia	British Rule	1961	1963	Success
Carnation Revolution	Portugal	Military Rule	1974	1974	Success
	Greece	Military Rule	1974	1974	Success
	South Korea	Military Junta	1979	1980	Failure
Prodemocracy Movement	Pakistan	Zia Al-Huq	1983	1983	Failure
	Mali	Military Rule	1989	1992	Success
	Slovenia	Communist Regime	1989	1990	Success
The Stir	Nepal	Monarch/Panchayat Regime	1989	1990	Partial Success
Strike of Fallen Arms	El Salvador	Martinez Dictatorship	1944	1944	Success
	Poland	Communist Regime	1956	1956	Partial Success
	Argentina	Attempted Coup	1986	1986	Success
	Chile	Ibanez regime	1931	1931	Success
	South Korea	Military Government	1987	1987	Partial Success
Defiance Campaign	South Africa	Apartheid	1952	1961	Failure
	Panama	Noriega Regime	1987	1989	Failure
Singing Revolution	Estonia	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
	Denmark	Nazi occupation	1944	1944	Partial Success
Hundred Flowers Movement	China	Communist Regime	1956	1957	Failure
Diretas Já	Brazil	Military Rule	1984	1985	Success
	Kenya	Daniel Arap Moi	1989	1989	Partial Success
Convention People's Party Movement	Ghana	British Rule	1951	1957	Success

Campaign	Location	Target	Start	End	Outcome
Rose Revolution	Georgia	Shevardnadze Regime	2003	2003	Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Thailand	Suchinda Regime	1992	1992	Partial Success
Kifaya	Egypt	Mubarak Regime	2000	2003	Partial Success
People Power	Philippines	Ferdinand Marcos	1983	1986	Success
	Taiwan	Autocratic Regime	1979	1985	Partial Success
	Malawi	Banda Regime	1992	1994	Success
Student Protest	Thailand	Military Dictatorship	1973	1973	Success
	Poland	Communist Regime	1968	1970	Partial Success
	Croatia	Semipresidential System	1999	2000	Success
Ruhrkampf Resistance	Germany	French Occupation	1923	1923	Success
	Senegal	Diouf Government	2000	2000	Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Tanzania	Mwinyi Regime	1992	1995	Partial Success
	Greece	Karamanlis	1963	1963	Success
Democracy Movement	China	Communist Regime	1976	1979	Failure
Prodemocracy Movement	East Germany	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
	Peru	Fujimori Government	2000	2000	Success
May Fourth Movement	China	Japanese Occupation	1919	1919	Partial Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Burma	Military Junta	1988	1988	Failure
	Zambia	One-Party Rule	1990	1991	Partial Success
	Czechoslovakia	Soviet Occupation	1968	1968	Failure
Antiapartheid	South Africa	Apartheid	1984	1994	Success
Tulip Revolution	Kyrgyzstan	Akayev Regime	2005	2005	Success
Active Voices	Madagascar	Didier Ratsiraka	1991	1993	Success
	Chile	August Pinochet	1983	1989	Success
Cedar Revolution	Lebanon	Syrian Forces	2005	2005	Success

Campaign	Location	Target	Start	End	Outcome
	Bolivia	Military Juntas	1977	1982	Success
	Indonesia	Suharto Rule	1997	1998	Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Hungary	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
	Thailand	Thaksin Regime	2005	2006	Success
	China	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Failure
	Pakistan	Khan Regime	1968	1969	Partial Success
	Hungary	Soviet Occupation	1956	1956	Failure
	Zambia	Chiluba Regime	2001	2001	Success
	Albania	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Partial Success
Anticoup	Venezuela	Anti-Chavez Coup	2002	2002	Success
	Venezuela	Jimenez Dictatorship	1958	1958	Success
	Tibet	Chinese Occupation	1987	1989	Failure
	Guyana	Burnham/Hoyte Autocratic Regime	1990	1992	Success
People Against Violence	Slovakia	Czech Communist Government	1989	1992	Partial Success
Iranian Revolution	Iran	Shah Reza Pahlavi	1977	1979	Success
	Nigeria	Military Rule	1993	1999	Success
	Norway	Nazi Occupation	1944	1944	Partial Success
October Revolutionaries	Guatemala	Ubico Dictatorship	1944	1944	Success
	Mongolia	Communist Regime	1989	1990	Partial Success
	Yugoslavia	Milosevic Regime	2000	2000	Success
Nyasaland African Congress	Malawi	British Rule	1958	1959	Success
Second People Power Movement	Philippines	Estrada Regime	2001	2001	Success
	Bulgaria	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
Velvet Revolution	Czechoslovakia	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success

Campaign	Location	Target	Start	End	Outcome
	Haiti	Jean-Claude Duvalier	1985	1985	Success
	Mexico	Calderón Regime	1989	1990	Partial Success
	Benin	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
Druze Resistance	Israel	Israel Occupation of Golan	1981	1981	Partial Success
	Bangladesh	Military Rule	1989	1990	Partial Success
	Belarus	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Partial Success
Solidarity	Poland	Communist Regime	1981	1989	Success
	Ghana	Rawlings Government	2000	2000	Success
	Romania	Ceausescu Regime	1987	1989	Failure
	Nepal	Nepalese Government, Martial Law	2006	2006	Partial Success
Kosovo-Albanian Nationalist Movement	Yugoslavia	Yugoslavian Government	1981	1981	Failure
Kosovo Albanian	Yugoslavia	Serbian Rule	1989	1999	Failure
Prodemocracy Movement/ Sajudis	Lithuania	Lithuanian Regime	1989	1991	Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Madagascar	Radsiraka Regime	2000	2003	Success
Student Revolution	South Korea	Rhee Regime	1960	1960	Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Latvia	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
Orange Revolution	Ukraine	Kuchma Regime	2001	2004	Success
	Mexico	Corrupt Government	1987	2000	Success
	Belarus	Belarus Government	2006	2006	Failure
Croatian Nationalists	Yugoslavia	Yugoslav Government	1970	1971	Failure
	West-Papua	Suchinda Regime	1992	1992	Failure

Campaign	Location	Target	Start	End	Outcome
Kyrgyztan Democratic Movement	Kyrgyztan	Communist Regime	1989	1989	Success
	Uruguay	Military Rule	1984	1985	Success
Timorese Resistance	East Timor	Indonesian Occupation	1988	1999	Success
	East Germany	Communist Regime	1956	1956	Failure
Ogoni Movement	Nigeria	Nigerian Government and Corporate Exploitation	1990	1995	Failure
	Niger	Military Rule	1991	1992	Failure
Independence Movement	Nigeria	British Occupation	1945	1950	Partial Success
Prodemocracy Movement	Russia	Anticoup	1990	1991	Success
	East Germany	Communist Regime	1953	1953	Failure
	India	British Rule	1919	1945	Partial Success
Student Protests	Yugoslavia	Communist Regime	1968	1968	Partial Success
	El Salvador	Military/Civilian Junta	1979	1981	Failure

Source: Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, “Table A.1 Nonviolent Campaigns,” Appendix, in *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Series of Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, ed. Bruce Hoffman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 233–236.

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APPENDIX B: NONVIOLENT ACTION METHODS

Table 3. 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action

THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION	
Formal Statements	
1. Public Speeches	27. New signs and names
2. Letters of opposition or support	28. Symbolic sounds
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions	29. Symbolic reclamations
4. Signed public statements	30. Rude gestures
5. Declarations of indictment and intention	Pressures on Individuals
6. Group or mass petitions	31. "Haunting" officials
Communications with a Wider Audience	32. Taunting officials
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols	33. Fraternization
8. Banners, posters, displayed communications	34. Vigils
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books	Drama and Music
10. Newspapers and journals	35. Humorous skits and pranks
11. Records, radio, and television	36. Performances of plays and music
12. Skywriting and earthwriting	37. Singing
Group Representations	Processions
13. Deputations	38. Marches
14. Mock awards	39. Parades
15. Group lobbying	40. Religious processions
16. Picketing	41. Pilgrimages
17. Mock elections	42. Motorcades
Symbolic Public Acts	Honoring the Dead
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors	43. Political mourning
19. Wearing of symbols	44. Mock funerals
20. Prayer and worship	45. Demonstrative funerals
21. Delivering symbolic objects	46. Homage at burial places
22. Protest disrobings	Public Assemblies
23. Destruction of own property	47. Assemblies of protest or support
24. Symbolic lights	48. Protest meetings
25. Displays of portraits	49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
26. Paint as protest	50. Teach-ins
	Withdrawal and Renunciation
	51. Walk-outs
	52. Silence
	53. Renouncing honors
	54. Turning one's back

THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION	
Ostracism of Persons	
55. Social boycott	86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
56. Selective social boycott	87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
57. Lysistratic nonaction	88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
58. Excommunication	89. Severance of funds and credit
59. Interdict	90. Revenue refusal
Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions	91. Refusal of a government's money
60. Suspension of social and sports activities	
61. Boycott of social affairs	
62. Student strike	
63. Social disobedience	
64. Withdrawal from social institutions	
Withdrawal from the Social System	
65. Stay-at-home	
66. Total personal noncooperation	
67. "Flight" of workers	
68. Sanctuary	
69. Collective disappearance	
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)	
THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION:	
ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS	
Actions by Consumers	
71. Consumers' boycott	
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods	
73. Policy of austerity	
74. Rent withholding	
75. Refusal to rent	
76. National consumers' boycott	
77. International consumers' boycott	
Action by Workers and Producers	
78. Workmen's boycott	
79. Producers' boycott	
Action by Middlemen	
80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott	
Action by Owners and Management	
81. Traders' boycott	
82. Refusal to let or sell property	
83. Lockout	
84. Refusal of industrial assistance	
85. Merchants' "general strike"	
	86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
	87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
	88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
	89. Severance of funds and credit
	90. Revenue refusal
	91. Refusal of a government's money
	Action by Governments
	92. Domestic embargo
	93. Blacklisting of traders
	94. International sellers' embargo
	95. International buyers' embargo
	96. International trade embargo
	THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION:
	THE STRIKE
	Symbolic Strikes
	97. Protest strike
	98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)
	Agricultural Strikes
	99. Peasant strike
	100. Farm Workers' strike
	Strikes by Special Groups
	101. Refusal of impressed labor
	102. Prisoners' strike
	103. Craft strike
	104. Professional strike
	Ordinary Industrial Strikes
	105. Establishment strike
	106. Industry strike
	107. Sympathetic strike
	Restricted Strikes
	108. Detailed strike
	109. Bumper strike
	110. Slowdown strike
	111. Working-to-rule strike
	112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in)
	113. Strike by resignation
	114. Limited strike
	115. Selective strike
	Multi-Industry Strikes
	116. Generalized strike
	117. General strike
	118. Hartal
	119. Economic shutdown

<p>THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION</p> <p>Rejection of Authority</p> <p>120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance 121. Refusal of public support</p> <p>Action by Governments</p> <p>122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance</p> <p>Citizens' Noncooperation with Government</p> <p>123. Boycott of legislative bodies 124. Boycott of elections 125. Boycott of government employment and positions 126. Boycott of government depts., agencies, and other bodies 127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions 128. Boycott of government-supported organizations 129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents 130. Removal of own signs and placemarks 131. Refusal to accept appointed officials 132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions</p> <p>Citizens' Alternatives to Obedience</p> <p>133. Reluctant and slow compliance 134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision 135. Popular nonobedience 136. Disguised disobedience 137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse 138. Sitdown 139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation 140. Hiding, escape, and false identities 141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws</p>	<p>Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures</p> <p>Action by Government Personnel</p> <p>142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides 143. Blocking of lines of command and information 144. Stalling and obstruction 145. General administrative noncooperation 146. Judicial noncooperation 147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents 148. Mutiny</p> <p>Domestic Governmental Action</p> <p>149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays 150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units</p> <p>International Governmental Action</p> <p>151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations 152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events 153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition 154. Severance of diplomatic relations 155. Withdrawal from international organizations 156. Refusal of membership in international bodies 157. Expulsion from international organizations</p> <p>THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION</p> <p>Psychological Intervention</p> <p>158. Self-exposure to the elements 159. The fast a) Fast of moral pressure b) Hunger strike c) Satyagrahic fast 160. Reverse trial 161. Nonviolent harassment</p>
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<p>Physical Intervention</p> <p>162. Sit-in 163. Stand-in 164. Ride-in 165. Wade-in 166. Mill-in 167. Pray-in 168. Nonviolent raids 169. Nonviolent air raids 170. Nonviolent invasion 171. Nonviolent interjection 172. Nonviolent obstruction 173. Nonviolent occupation</p> <p>Social Intervention</p> <p>174. Establishing new social patterns 175. Overloading of facilities 176. Stall-in 177. Speak-in 178. Guerrilla theater 179. Alternative social institutions 180. Alternative communication system</p> <p>Economic Intervention</p> <p>181. Reverse strike 182. Stay-in strike 183. Nonviolent land seizure 184. Defiance of blockades 185. Politically motivated counterfeiting 186. Preclusive purchasing 187. Seizure of assets 188. Dumping 189. Selective patronage 190. Alternative markets 191. Alternative transportation systems 192. Alternative economic institutions</p> <p>Political Intervention</p> <p>193. Overloading of administrative systems 194. Disclosing identities of secret agents 195. Seeking imprisonment 196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws 197. Work-on without collaboration 198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government</p>	
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Source: Gene Sharp, “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action,” http://www.ainstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/198_methods-1.pdf.

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